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PAYOLA-CAN PAY-FOR-PLAY BE
PRACTICALLY ENFORCED?
DEVIN KOSARt
Payola is against the public interest. It turns the whole
notion of encouraging and promoting this important part of
our cultural heritage into a commercial vehicle. Some of the
most imaginative art on earth was born in the hearts and
souls of American composers. I believe that music is one of
our major contributions to world culture. Allowing creativity
to be stifled because of questionable commercial endeavors or
legal gymnastics is just plain wrong. I believe that's what
the government had in mind when they implemented laws
prohibiting the influence of money on airplay.--John
Conyers Jr.'
INTRODUCTION

Payola or pay-for-play, in the context of broadcast radio, is the
playing of music or other programming by radio stations in
exchange for payments or other valuable consideration given on
behalf of a record label.2 Record labels engage in this practice in
order to promote their artists on the radio, which is the most
successful way to gain publicity. Until recently, federal anti-

t J.D. Candidate, June 2008, St. John's University School of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Akilah Folami for her help, guidance and inspiration in formulating
this note; Jessica Baquet for her tireless help and support in making the publication of
this note possible; and Kelly Clark for her continuous patience and support throughout
the entire writing process.
1 Chuck Phillips, Conyers to Press for Tougher Enforcement of Laws on Payola, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, at B1 (quoting John Conyers Jr., Representative for the House
Judiciary Committee (D-Mich.)).
2 See
Free
Press,
Ten Things
You
Need to
Know about Payola,
http://freepress.net/payola/=faqs (last visited Oct. 27, 2007) (providing basic facts about
payola); see also Lauren J. Katunich, Time to Quit Paying the Payola Piper: Why Music
Industry Abuse Demands a Complete System Overhaul, 22 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 643, 644
(2002) (defining the term "payola").
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payola laws 3 have only been enforced three times since their
enactment.4 Quiz show scandals prompted the first major payola
investigation in the 1960s, which fully exposed the rampant
The
abuse of payola practices in radio broadcasting.
investigation led to radio disc jockeys being stripped of all
authority to make musical programming decisions and the firing
of nationally renowned disc jockey, Alan Freed.5 The second
enforcement
occurred
in
2000,
when
the
Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") fined Clear Channel
Communications, Inc. $8,000 for not disclosing payments it
received to increase airplay of a Bryan Adams song. Despite
limited enforcement, there have been constant allegations and
news reports about the flagrant abuse of payola 6 by record labels
that want to increase radio airplay of their songs. The current
effects of payola are present in the monotonous radio playlists,
high CD prices, and the limited number of new artists heard on
the radio. However, until recently, Congress and the FCC have
rarely enforced anti-payola laws, rendering them largely
ineffective.
It was not until 2003, when former New York Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer 7 began a three-year payola investigation, resulting
in $35 million in settlements that the FCC begrudgingly awoke
3 The anti-payola laws were codified by 47 U.S.C. §§ 317 and 508, which prohibit
broadcasting stations and their employees from receiving undisclosed payments in
exchange for a song's airplay on the radio. The FCC is empowered to regulate payola by
the Communications Act of 1934. The Act gave the federal government the power to
regulate wire and radio communications throughout the country. It essentially gave the
federal government the power (through the Federal Communications Commission) to
regulate radio station airwaves. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-573
(2007).
4 See Federal Communications Commission, Payola and Sponsorship Identification,
http://www.fcc.gov/eblbroadcastisponsid.html (last updated Oct. 18, 2007) (listing three
enforcement actions of payola laws dating before 2007).
5 See, e.g., Sanford Nowlin, Payola'sLast Song?, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 2,
2006 at B1. Alan Freed, who coined the phrase "rock 'n' roll," was a nationally renowned
radio disc jockey convicted of commercial bribery charges in 1962 as a result of payola
practices; Elizabeth Guider, Quiz Scandal Crossed Wires in '59, VARIETY, Jul. 31, 2005,
available at http://www.variety.com/index.asp?layout=varietylOO&content=jump&jump
=article&articleID=VR 1117926754&category= 1930.
6 See Interview by Ray Suarez with Christopher Sterling, Professor, George
Washington University, at PBS (Jul. 26, 2005), availableat http://www.pbs.org/newshour
Ibblbusiness/july-dec05/payola_7-26.html (discussing the frequency of payola in the radio
industry).
7 Eliot Spitzer retired from his post as the Attorney General when he was elected as
the 54th governor of New York State in 2007. See Danny Hakim, Spitzer is Sworn and
Begins Push on Ethics Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2007, at Al; Danny Hakim, Thorny Issue
Faces Spitzer in Day-After Pleasantries,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at P15.
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from its 40-year payola slumber.S The FCC engaged in its own
nation-wide payola "investigation"9 and issued a consent decree
in April 2007, which resulted in a $12.5 million settlement
The
between the four largest broadcasting conglomerates.
consent decree also called for a good faith agreement by record
labels and radio stations to allot 42,000 hours for independent
music on their broadcast stations.1 0 Some activists, scholars and
artists view this settlement as a positive step in the right
direction to eliminating payola, while many others criticize it as
a slap on the wrist for record and broadcast companies. These
critics contend that payola will continue in the radio industry
unless the record and broadcast companies are forced to pay a
substantial fine or the executives behind these corporate entities
are held criminally liable for their payola practices.
What can be done to tame the payola beast in radio, then?
This note chronicles the payola practice and explores the possible
remedies to practically enforce this controversial practice. The
FCC appears to be so overwhelmed with complaints of indecency
See William Triplett, Radio Finetunes Deal, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 6, 2007, at 4
(noting that federal investigations relating to payola practices, which were brought by
Eliot Spitzer, resulted in fines "totaling more than $36 million" for four major record

labels); see also Ryan Underwood, Radio Industry Challenged to Avoid Payola Relapse,
TENNESSEAN, Mar. 11, 2007, at Al (positing that New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer's "aggressive payola investigation," which resulted in at least $36 million in fines
caused record labels and radio companies to handle their relations with each other with
caution).
9 The term "investigation" is placed in quotations to indicate that although the FCC
purported to investigate payola practices, it failed to conduct a legitimate and thorough
investigation, especially after Eliot Spitzer provided the FCC with a "mountain of
evidence" supporting the notion that the recording industry's biggest labels were engaging
in payola. See Phil Rosenthal, FCC's 'Swift' Action a Bit Late to Payola Party, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Aug. 10, 2005 at C3. Instead, the FCC simply released a consent decree that
levied less than half the amount of fines that New York State had issued to the same
record labels that were found guilty of payola. See Interview by Chuck D. with Paul
Porter, Co-Founder of musical activist group, Industry Ears, in Washington D.C. (Mar. 5,
http://www.voxunion.com/realaudio/coupradio/PPorterFCC.mp3
available at
2007),
[hereinafter Paul Porter Interview].
'0 See John Dunbar, 4 Radio Firms Settle Payola Case, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 14,
2007, available at http://www.philly.com/inquirer/business/20070414-4 radiofirms
_settle-payolacase.html (explaining that Clear Channel Communications Inc., CBS
Radio, Entercom Communications Corp. and Citadel Broadcasting Corp., four of the
nation's largest radio station owners, agreed to pay a fine of $12.5 million and to avoid
engaging in payola practices, in compliance with a consent decree issued by the FCC); see

also Press Release, Industry Ears, Industry Ears Statement on the FCC Payola
Settlement: Radio Has the FCC Playing the Tunes (Aug. 2007), http://www.industr
[hereinafter Industry Ears
years.compress.php?subaction=showfull&id=1173147951
Press Release] (stating that as a result of "consent decrees between record companies and
New York State," an agreement was reached for the four major record labels to pay a
$12.5 million fine).
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on radio and television that it cannot adequately investigate
radio payola practices. 1 This note examines the effectiveness of a
possible RICO suit brought against record labels or broadcasting
conglomerates as a solution to the payola problems in radio.
Alternatively, this note proposes that other state attorney
generals throughout the country bring their own lawsuit against
record and broadcasting companies, similar to former New York
State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's effective payola lawsuits.
Part I of this note traces the history of payola and its origins
throughout radio. Part II examines how the modern era of
payola
began
to take
shape,
the passage
of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the emergence of
independent promotion used by record labels to circumvent antipayola laws. Finally, Part III provides an analysis of the current
state of radio and what can be done to practically enforce payola
in the hopes of ending payola once and for all.
I. PAYOLA'S BEGINNINGS
A. The ABCs of Payola
The term "payola" was first coined by the trade publication
Variety in 1938.12 The term is a combination of "payment" and
the name 'Victrola," the name of the wind-up record players used
at the time.' 3 In a conventional sense, payola exists when a
sponsor "promotes a media experience, such as a musical work,
" The number of indecency complaints involving radio and television broadcasting
steadily increased from 2000 until 2006. Federal Communications Commission, Indecency
Complaints and NALs: 1993-2006, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/ComplStatChart.pdf (last
visited Oct. 27, 2007). As a result of the Federal Communications Commission's struggle
to deal with an overwhelming number of concerns in 2006 "over the content of television
and radio shows," it worked to revamp the system it used to handle such indecency
complaints. Frank Ahrens, FCC Aims to Speed Evaluation of Indecency Complaints,
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2005 at E01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comwpdyn/articles/A9272-2005Feb8.html.
12 Celia Wren, Do You Speak Showbiz: Variety Celebrates 100 Years of Slanguage,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2005 at D1,available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas
/articles20050227do-youspeak-showbiz (stating that Variety, a trade publication
which has been responsible for introducing "quirky jargon it uses to repot on the business
of entertainment," is the earliest source for slang terms such as "payola," which was
coined in 1938).
13 See Rosenthal, supra note 9 (noting that the term "payola" is a blend of the words
"payoff' and "Victrola"); see also $10M 'Payola' Settlement, CBS NEWS, Jul. 25, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2005/07/25/entertainmentlprintable7l1424.shtml
(explaining term payola as a contraction of "pay" and "Victrola" record players).
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by purchasing audience exposure to the experience as a form of
advertisement [without disclosure of such payment]. '
The
problem with this form of stealth marketing is that it "blurs the
line between publicity and advertising by concealing sponsorship
for a price.' The practice of a radio station exchanging payment
for playing a song is illegal payola only if the station fails to
inform listeners that it was paid to do so. 16 However, radio
stations are "reluctant to pepper their programming with
announcements like '[t]he previous. .. [song] was paid for by
Sony Records."" 7 Furthermore, radio stations want to maintain
the illusion that they "sift through stacks of records and pick out
only the best ones for their listeners."'"
The theory of harm behind payola is that undisclosed
sponsorship of songs inhibits competition, over-commercializes
radio, and deceives the listening audience into thinking songs are
selected for airplay based on merit rather than payment.' 9
Record labels engage in radio payola because "radio airplay
remains the greatest stimulant to sales of most recordings.
Airplay by a popular radio station 'may stimulate airplay at radio
stations in other geographic [locations].' 2 ° Since radio airplay
acts as the gatekeeper for all popular music, attaching monetary
14 Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketingand EditorialIntegrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 89
(2006).
1" Id. at 90.
16 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2007). In addition to section 317, section 73.1212(a) of

the Federal Communication Commission's Rules requires that "a sponsorship
identification be given [w]hen a broadcast station transmits any matter for which money,
service, or other valuable consideration is either directly or indirectly paid or promised to,
or charged or accepted by such station." David D. Oxenford & Brendan Holland, A $12.5
Million Teaching Tool: The Recent Payola Consent Decrees, Jun. 2007,
http://www.dwt.com/practc/broadcast/bulletins/06-07_Payola.htm
(internal quotations
omitted).
'7 Eric Boehlert, Pay for Play, SALON, Mar. 14, 2001, http://archive.salon.com/ent
/featuRosre/2001/03/14/payola/print.html.
18 Id.

19 See Douglas Abell, Music: Pay-for-Play: An Old Tactic in a New Environment, 2
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 52, 55 (2000) (claiming that payola leads to songs being given
airplay based on payment rather than "research, marketing, and requests."); see also
Goodman, supra note 14, at 99-100 (arguing that mandatory sponsorship disclosure
would help prevent these evils).
20 Rachel M. Stilwell, Which Public? Whose Interest? How the FCC's Deregulation of
Radio Station Ownership Has Harmed the Public Interest, And How We Can Escape From
the Swamp, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 369, 394 (2006); see Lorne Manly, How Payola Went
Corporate, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2005 ("Radio is still the biggest single factor to get
something going ... commercial radio reaches more people in a shorter period of time,
and that is the recipe for a hit.").
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requirements to radio access instead of using a21 system of
meritocracy limits exposure for many diverse artists.
To counteract these social ills, Congress enacted anti-payola
disclosure laws in order to bolster "public trust in the
institutional media. 2 2 The FCC was empowered to regulate
payola practices under Section 317 of the Communications Act of
1934, which required:
All matter broadcast by any radio station for which service,
money or any other valuable consideration is directly or
indirectly paid or promised to ... the station so
broadcasting.., shall be announced as paid for or furnished,
as the case may be by such person.23
The purpose of the legislation was to inform the listening
audience that it was hearing or viewing matter which was being
broadcast in exchange for consideration, rather than because of
artistic merit.2 4 Therefore, such sponsorship had to be clearly
identified.2 5 The FCC has jurisdiction over any payola complaints
to determine whether an alleged action violates sections 317
and/or 508,26 the anti-payola laws. If a formal complaint is filed
alleging that a radio station is receiving illegal payments, the
FCC investigates the matter and then refers it to the
Department of Justice if enforcement is needed.2 7
21

See Boehlert, supra note 17 (asserting that, despite the corruption in payola radio

practices, payola served a real purpose in providing independent artists an opportunity to
be on an equal playing field with major artists, as long as they could afford it); Goodman,
supra note 14, at 103 (positing that payola practices reduce the diversity of artists or
views on the market because they cause the market to be flooded with only a limited
number of products).
22 Goodman, supra note 14, at 125.
23 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2007). See generally R. H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television
Broadcasting,22 J.L. & ECON. 269 (1979) (noting that "this section, which was taken from
the Radio Act of 1927, had apparently been based on a section of the Postal
Appropriations Act of 1912 under which editorial and other published material appearing
in newspapers.., had to be clearly marked 'advertisement' if money or other valuable
consideration had been paid in return for publication.").
24 See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2007); see also In re Nat'l Broad. Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 75, 1 (1970)
(asserting that section 317's purpose "is to require that the audience be clearly informed
that it is hearing or viewing matter which has been paid for, when such is the case, and
that the person paying for the broadcast of the matter be clearly identified.").
25 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
26 See 47 U.S.C. §503 (2007); see also Katunich, supra note 2, at 649 ('The FCC may
exercise its discretion to make factual findings to determine if the alleged actions violate
sections 317 and 508 only once a formal complaint is filed.").
27 Violators may be subject to monetary sanctions or non-renewal of station licenses.
See Federal Communications Commission, FCC 88-175, 4 F.C.C.R. 7708 (1988) (stating
that the Department of Justice has the primary responsibility of enforcing the law); see
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B. The History of Payola
Radio payola practices were first reported by the press during
the big band era in the 1930s. Payola occurred when band
leaders and performers were given gifts by music publishers as
an incentive to perform their songs during the band's radio
shows.28 A song's popularity with public consumers and its
subsequent sheet music sales depended on exposure by the big
bands on the radio, which was the primary medium through
which one could gain access to consumers. Band leaders often
29
received outright payment or a share in a publisher's profits.
By the end of World War II, the radio programs of the big band
era faded away and the rock 'n' roll era emerged.3 ° Since the
development of television led to increased competition for
audiences, the radio and music industry began to change in order
to recapture the American public. Radio was forced to reinvent
itself, and "stations increasingly featured recorded music played
by [disc jockeys] .'31 As a result, a promotional culture emerged
"in which songs, records and performers competed with one
another to maximize their exposure on radio. 32 As radio disc
jockeys controlled access to the airwaves, "it became apparent
that the playing of a record by a disc jockey increased the sales of
that record and the desire of record companies to have their
records played on disc jockey programs led naturally to payola. 33
Payola became rampant during radio's musical heyday in the
1950's and 1960's when disc jockeys were frequently bribed by
competing record companies to get exposure for fledgling rock 'n'
also Katunich, supra note 2, at 649 (explaining that the FCC must turn violators over to
the Department of Justice for enforcement).
28 See Manly, supra note 20, at 1 ('[s]ong pluggers' urged certain songs on big band
leaders in the 1930's and 40's, accompanied by bundles of cash to make the musical choice
easier."). See generally Coase, supra note 23 (discussing the historical context of payola).
29 See Manly, supra note 20, at 1 (reporting that band leaders were given various
bribes to play certain songs); see also Coase, supra note 23, at 286-87 (observing that
record company payments to disc jockeys became widespread when record companies
realized that radio play increased the sales of records).
30 See Kielbowicz & Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Commercials in Broadcasting:
Origins of the Sponsorship IdentificationRegulations, 1927-1963, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 329,
347-350 (2004) (stating that rock 'n roll reshaped radio during the 1950s); see also Coase,
supra note 23, at 286 (noting that the big band radio programs were largely replaced with
disk jockeys playing recordings).
31 Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 30, at 350.
32 Id. at 351.
33 Coase, supra note 23, at 286-87.
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roll and pop artists. 34 Disc jockeys were given cash payments on a
weekly or monthly basis, royalties on record sales, lavish gifts,
and other financial arrangements that would more than double
their salaries.3 5 The practice commonly involved a promoter from
a band or record company that would typically induce a disc
jockey to play a particular song on the radio. 36 "Payola afflicted
all stages of the music industry, from composers angling to land
recording contracts to record promoters bribing deejays for more
airtime. ,,37
The first big payola scandal erupted in November 1959, when
the House Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight began an
investigation into payola radio practices in response to the quiz
show television scandals of the late 1950s. 38 The investigation
focused on small independent record labels, disc jockeys and
34 See Rosenthal, supra note 9, at 3 (noting Eliot Spitzer's payola investigation
revealed that "in exchange for playing a Celine Dion song, a radio program director could
score from Sony BMG's Epic label a two-night trip to Las Vegas for two with the chance to
meet Dion."). See generally Oxenford & Holland, supra note 16 ("the terms of the Consent
Decrees provide a set of best practices toward which all broadcasters should strive in
order to avoid allegations of payola.").
35 See Coase, supra note 23, at 294 (highlighting that such gifts included "a share
in a
record company, advertisements in the disc jockeys' hit sheets, the reimbursement of
recording stars' fees for appearances on the disc jockeys' programs or at record shops
which they organized, expensive gifts, and mortgage loans on disc jockeys' homes");
Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 30, at 350 (revealing that individuals at "congressional
hearings recounted colorful stories about payments to station personnel").
36 See Kielbowicz & Lawson supra note 30, at 350 (specifying in addition to deejays,
record librarians or program managers were also persuaded by the promoters to play
particular music); see also United States v. Goodman, 945 F.2d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1991)
(discussing the fact that the defendant in this case "promoted records by contacting radio
stations throughout the United States in an effort to persuade the stations to add records
to their play-lists. He was compensated by record companies based upon the success of his
endeavors.").
37 Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 30, at 350.
38 The hearing's primary purpose was to investigate payola practices. See
Responsibilities of BroadcastingLicensees and Station Personnel: Hearing on Payola and
Other Deceptive Practices in the BroadcastingField Before the Spec. Subcomm. on Legis.
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong. 1 (1960)
[hereinafter Responsibilities of BroadcastingLicensees]; see also Coase, supra, note 23, at
292. The FCC's lax enforcement of Section 317 resulted in rampant payola practices by
television advertisers who rigged quiz shows such as the NBC program "Twenty One."
Advertisers would also pay to have contestants appear on a game show so that the
contestant could talk about that advertiser's product on the game show. Coarse, supra
note 23, at 288-291. These practices "merged in the public's mind to form one image of
commercialism's corrupting influence on broadcasting." Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note
30, at 347. The controversy first gained national attention on August 28, 1958, when
various newspapers published interviews by former contestants on "Twenty One." The
contestants claimed the program was rigged by advertisers engaging in payola practices.
The articles subsequently led to an investigation by New York prosecutor Joseph Stone
and led to subsequent Congressional hearings on payola. Free Press, Payola - Fifty Years
of Pay for Play, http://www.freepress.net/payola/=history (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
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other corrupt influences in the business. 39 Representative Oren
Harris commented on the numerous complaints about payola
practices in broadcasting by stating:
The quality of broadcast programs declines when the
choice of program materials is made not in the public
interest, but in the interest of those who are willing to pay
to obtain exposure of their records. The public is misled as
to the popularity of records played. Moreover, these
practices constitute unfair competition with honest
businessmen who refuse to engage in them. They tend to
drive out of business small firms who lack the means to
survive this unfair competition.40
Ironically, Congress and the FCC were well aware of such
practices, yet did little to enforce the laws under section 317 of
the Communications Act, even though lawmakers and industry
critics repeatedly questioned the FCC's failure to act.4 1 "By most
accounts, payola was hardly an industry secret."4 2 An additional
enforcement problem was that the statutory language of section
317 referred specifically to the need for disclosure of payments
made to the station directly.4 3 Payola in the 1950's did not
usually involve payments to radio stations, but involved
39 See Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to Executive Law Section 63(15),
In the
Matter of Sony BMG Music Entertainment, Attorney General of the State of New York,
(Jul. 22, 2005),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/jul/payola.pdf
[hereinafter Consent Decree] (describing the focus of the probe as being independent
record labels, disc jockeys, and other outside influences); see generally Responsibilities of
BroadcastingLicensees, supra note 38.
40 See Coase, supra note 23, at 292 (quoting Responsibilities of BroadcastingLicensees,
supra note 38, at 1 (statement of Rep. Oren Harris, Chairman, H. Spec. Subcomm. on
Legis. Oversight)).
41 See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 30, at 354 (noting that the
FCC was
dominated by appointees from President Eisenhower, who were "disinclined to regulate
broadcast content"); see also Lawrence W. Lichty, The Impact of FRC and FCC
Commissioners' Background on the Regulation of Broadcasting, 6 J. BROADCASTING 97,
105-06 (1962) (finding that a majority of commissioners serving from 1953 to 1960
believed in minimal FCC scrutiny of broadcast programming practices).
42 Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 30, at 354. Perhaps corruption
amongst the FCC
itself may have been partly responsible for the lax attitude in regulation. Indeed,
Commissioner Richard A. Mack was alleged to have been given money by broadcast
stations in order to receive licenses, and would later resign amid further assertions of
impropriety. See Coase, supra note 23, at 287; see also Crooked Halos, TIME, Mar. 17,
1958, availableat http:/www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,863138,00.html.
43 See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 317, 48 Stat. 1064, 1089 (1934) (current
version at 47 U.S.C.S. § 317 (2007)) (specifying announcement must be made when radio
stations receive money in exchange for broadcasting material); see also Coase, supra note
23, at 296 (concluding that section 317 referred to disclosure of payments made to radio
stations).
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payments made directly to disc jockeys." Since the disc jockeys
were secretly receiving personal bribes to play songs on the air,
there was no actual violation of the anti-payola laws under
section 317. 45
As a result of the investigations, Congress expanded upon the
disclosure requirements for payola practices by enacting the
Communications Act Amendments of 1960.46 The Amendments
added several provisions to Section 317, such as requiring radio
stations and their employees to exercise due diligence to ensure
that payment disclosure announcements took place if a song was
paid to be played on the radio. 7 In addition to the amendments,
Congress included in the Communications Act an affirmative
obligation on the part of station or record company employees to
disclose any sort of payola practice to that radio station or else
they would be subjected to imprisonment and fines of up to
$10,000.48 Section 508 strengthened the anti-payola laws by
creating an affirmative duty for radio station employees to
disclose payments and by attaching criminal liability to anyone
44 See Coase, supra note 23, at 296 ("payola in the 1950's did not, generally speaking,
involve payments to stations; rather they were made to disc jockeys."); see also Daniel
Gross,
What's Wrong With Payola?, SLATE, Jul. 27, 2005, available at
http://slate.com/id/2123483/nav/tapl/ (noting popular DJ in 1950s era took cash in
exchange for playing records).
41 "All matter broadcast by any radio station for which service, money, or any valuable
consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or promised to or charged or accepted by, the
station so broadcasting, from any person, shall at the time the same is so broadcast, be
announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such person." Communications
Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 317, 48 Stat. 1064, 1089 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C.S. §
317 (2007)). This language, quoted from section 317, only applied to radio station
management or executives and not individual disc jockeys. See Coase, supra note 23, at
296.
46 See Coase, supra note 23, at 295 (concluding that subcommittee deliberations
resulted in amendments to the Communications Act); see also Communications Act
Amendments: Hearing on H.R. 11341 Before a Subcomm. on Communications and Power
of the H. Comm. On Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong. 1 (1960) [hereinafter 1960
Amendments] (noting previous congressional investigation provoked legislative action).
41 See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2007) ('The licensee of each radio station shall exercise
reasonable diligence to obtain from its employees, and from other person with whom it
deals directly in connection with any program or program matter for broadcast,
information to enable such licensee to make the announcment required by this section.");
see also 1960 Amendments, supra note 46, at 162 (highlighting under new amendment
radio stations were obligated to use "reasonable diligence").
48 See 47 U.S.C. § 508 (2007) (requiring that station or record company employees
disclose any sort of payola practice to that radio station or else they would "be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both"); see also Kielbowicz &
Lawson, supra note 30, at 363 (stating that "[t]o assist stations in exercising 'reasonable
diligence,' Congress added an entirely new section to the Communications Act that
imposed the disclosure requirement on anyone involved in placing plugs in broadcast
programs.").
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who engages in undisclosed payola practices in violation of
section 317. In addition, section 508 remedied the problem posed
by individual disc jockeys, whose actions were not punishable
under the original anti-payola laws under section 317, by
providing for criminal punishment of individuals who engage in
undisclosed payola for their own personal gain.4 9 "Traditional
sponsorship identification rules [under section 317] applied when
a station cooperated in promoting the interests of someone else;
the latest proposal [under section 508] applied when stations or
networks inserted covert promotions for their own enrichment. '5 °
C. The Fallout After the FirstPayola Scandal
In the aftermath, the payola scandal created headlines and
new laws, ruined careers, and tarnished the reputation of the
music industry in the eyes of the-American public. 51 'Music fans
were newly suspicious every time they heard a disc jockey
describing a record with unusual enthusiasm. 5 2 As a result,
many radio stations and broadcasters fired their disc jockeys
despite those disc jockeys' insistence that money did not
influence their broadcast selections. 53 Eventually, programming
power was taken away from individual disc jockeys and given to
49 See Goodman, supra note 14, at 99 (commenting that "Congress strengthened 317 by
extending the sponsorship disclosure requirement to broadcast station employees, and
[by] criminalizing the failure to do so."); see also Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 30, at
363 (stating that "[t]he provision expressly covered employees as well; they had to
'disclose the fact of such acceptance or payment or agreement' to their employers.").
50 Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 30, at 370.
5' See Bob Greene, Payola,Part 2: Will Anyone Even Notice?, CHI. TRIB., Jun. 24, 2001,
at C2 ('Why did a disc jockey play a song? Because he thought it had a catchy tune,
because he liked the lyrics or the sound of the singer's voice. That's what America had
sort of believed."); see also Miriam Longino, A Century in the Arts, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
July 4, 1999 at K5 (highlighting the headlines that the payola scandal made when "DJs
testif[ied] before Congress that they had accepted money to play certain records").
52 Greene, supra note 51, at K5.
6' Many disc jockeys were fired as a result of payola; including national renowned disc
jockey Alan Freed, who coined the phrase "rock 'n' roll." Freed's career was ruined after he
admitted he accepted money from record labels after he was indicted by a New York
grand jury on bribery charges. See, e.g., Nowlin, supra note 5; see also Kielbowicz &
Lawson, supra note 30, at 351. During the Congressional investigatory hearings, music
and cultural icon Dick Clark was also questioned concerning his role in payola practices
in connection with his popular music television program, American Bandstand. There
were frequent allegations that Clark was cross-promoting the records of artists with
whom he was financially involved by playing or featuring that artist or the artist's songs
on his show. Clark denied he had violated any broadcast regulations. However, the ABC
network eventually forced Clark to relinquish his financial holdings in various musical
enterprises. Id. at 351-52.
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station managers.5 4 Radio stations made this shift in their
broadcast decision-making processes in order to protect
themselves from payola sanctions. 55 In addition, because more
radio stations were emerging, "competition for listeners became
so fierce that managers could no longer afford to have disc
jockeys experimenting with [unpopular or unknown songs]. 56
Consequently,
station
managers began imposing more
centralized programming,
which led to the rise of formulaic Top
57
40 play lists.
Ironically, by reining in the disc jockey's musical decisionmaking power in favor of a centralized control model, the radio
stations actually facilitated a new and more comprehensive form
of payola practices.58 Record executives were now able to engage
in payola practices solely by reaching a station's program
director, rather than multiple disc jockeys.5 9

54 See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 30, at 352 (explaining that station managers
took more control over station programming); see also Richard Harrington & Jacqueline
Trescott, Pay-to-Play Record Scandal? Safeguards Working, Local Stations Say, WASH.
POST, Mar. 5, 1986, at D1 ("[tihe major difference between then and now... is that the
power of song selection has been transferred from the deejay to the program and music
directors.").
55 The idea was that if access to the disc jockeys were limited, record labels would have
a harder time engaging in undisclosed payola. It was thought that radio stations, as a
result, could protect themselves from violating section 508 and subjecting themselves to
any criminal liability. In reality, however, divesting broadcast programming decisions
from local disc jockeys actually facilitated payola practices. Record labels no longer had to
bribe multiple disc jockeys at various stations. Instead, they needed only to bribe one
program manager or corporate executive, who would have influence over multiple radio
stations in an area. See Robert Lindsey, Payola's Return to Records Reported, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 1985 at A14.
56 Eric Zorn, For The Record: Money Still Talks in Radioland, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20,
1985, at C1 (observing that "The new programming practices only centralized the activity
moving it closer to the seats of power and making it harder to detect."); see Lindsey, supra
note 55, at A14 ("Under the '"Top 40" format... a radio station limits its music play list to
40 or fewer current hits, which are played several times daily.").
5' See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 30, at 352 (noting that station managers
imposed more strictures on deejays, leading to more "Top 40" style broadcasting formats);
see also Lindsey, supra note 55, at A14 (describing the increased use of "Top 40" airplay
by radio stations); Zorn, supra note 56 ("The new programming practices only centralized
the activity moving it closer to the seats of power and making it harder to detect.").
"8 See Zorn, supra note 56, at Cl (discussing new programming practices that
concentrated activity among higher authorities, and therefore made payola practices
harder to detect); see also Manly, supra note 20, at 1 (explaining that Congress' regulation
of payola fostered unintended results as power to make decisions moved from several disc
jockeys to program directors alone).
'9 See Manly, supra note 20, at 1 (noting that disc jockeys lost power to choose music to
play on the air, instead this became the responsibility of program directors); see also
Stilwell, supra note 20, at 412 (reporting that, in 2002, Cox Radio CEO Bob Neil claimed
that program directors make decisions on individual records).
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II. NEW AGE PAYOLA BEGINS To TAKE SHAPE

A. The Rise of the Indies
While radio stations occupy one side of the payola spectrum,
record labels occupy the other. After the first payola scandal and
the 1960 amendments, record companies began to distance
themselves from payola allegations by relying on independent
promoters 60 ("indies") to do their dirty work in hopes of
circumventing the anti-payola laws. 61 As conduits for the record
labels, indies lobbied radio stations across the country to play
new particular songs.6 2 The practice of using indies thwarted
anti-payola statutes because "[through the use of indies,] radio
stations [were] one step removed from record label money," and,
63
therefore, the payments received [were] technically not payola.
Record labels realized the benefits of employing indies, and thus
the indies "became a source of continuity in a rapidly changing
industry as well as a cost-cutting alternative to in-house
promotional staffs., 64 The indies forged close relationships with
60 See Boehlert, supra note 17 (stating that indies are "shadowy middlemen" to whom
record companies will pay millions of dollars to get their songs played on the radio. Indies
pay stations large sums of money in "promotional payments" and then every time stations
add an artist's song to play lists, indies get paid by record labels); see also Eric Boehlert,
Record Companies: Save Us From Ourselves!, SALON, Mar. 13, 2002, available at
http://dir.salon.com/story/ent/feature/2002/03/13/indie-promotion/index.html
(discussing
that record companies and radio stations are arguing over who is going to clean up
current play-by-play systems, while radio stations continue to play songs that will make
money for them, rather than music that people want to hear).
61 "The primary tool used to make a mockery of payola laws has no elaborate maker or
convoluted design; rather, it is the pure and simple use of a middleman." Katunich, supra
note 2, at 656. "Today, rather than making individual deals, indies typically pay an
annual fee to a radio stations- usually $100,000 or more - 'not for airplay, they say, but
for advanced copied of their play lists,' and in return, they charge the record labels for
every song that ends up on that play list." Krystal Conway, The Long Road to Desuetude
for Payola Laws: Recognizing the Inevitable Commodification of Tastemaking, 16 SETON
HALL J. OF SPORTS & ENT. L. 343, 353 (2006).
62 See Conway, supra note 61, at 354 (clarifying that Indies pay an annual fee to radio
stations under the guise of payment for advanced play lists, as a way to 'side step the
law'); see also Katunich, supra note 2, at 657 (explaining that because there is a limited
number of songs that can be played on the radio, indies can act as lobbyist for record
companies by supplying crucial information to radio stations, such as the likelihood of
popularity for recording, and target demographics).
63 See Katunich, supra note 2, at 656; see also Sarah Greene, Clear Channel v.
Competition Act of 2002: Is There a Clear End in Sight?, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J.ART & ENT. L.
& POLy 387, 415 (2002) (discussing indies' role in removing radio stations from record
label money and thwarting anti-payola laws).
6
Zorn, supra note 56 (stating that one consequence of radio station consolidation in
the mid-1970's was "streamlining of operations that resulted in the increased importance
of independent promoters [indies]"); see Gregory M. Prindle, No Competition: How Radio
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radio programmers "by guaranteeing the station a lump sum of
money deemed 'promotional support."'6 5
During the 1980s, the power of indie promoters and their
exorbitant costs were becoming a cause for concern in the
industry. The influential indies were a small group of less than
30 promoters known as "The Network," who dominated the radio
industry and operated an informal cartel using questionable
business practices to achieve their goals.6 6 The Network members
were 'often hired to work as a loosely knit association in
promoting the same record nationwide,' and had allocated among
themselves access to playlists at forty-one important radio
stations in two dozen American cities. 6 7 As the indie promoters
obtained a stranglehold on radio station playlists throughout the
nation, the prices that indies charged the record labels began to
skyrocket.68 Despite the frustrations felt by record label
executives concerning excessive fees and shady business
practices, many label executives were afraid to stop paying indie
Consolidation Has Diminished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279, 308-09 (discussing negative financial impact on record
companies if labels forfeit use of indies to push promotional radio airplay).
61 See Katunich, supra note 2, at 658; see also Boehlert, supra note 17 (stating that
"[t]he problem for record companies has always been that there are too many radio
stations - and too many egos - nationwide for staffers to keep close tabs on. So they need
to hire Indies...").
66 See Stilwell, supra note 20, at 395-96. 'The Network" dominated the indie field and
was highly influential in the music industry. Id. Joe Isgro, an accused 'soldier' for the
Gambino organized crime family, was "[t]he Network's most notorious and powerful
member .... Id.; Published reports and allegations claimed that indies often gave sex,
money, drugs and other favors to personnel at important radio stations to insure that
their songs got added to the station's play list. Zorn, supra note 56. Indie promoters also
employed a "paper adds" technique, paying radio stations to put songs on chart ranking
lists. Id. As a result, certain songs appeared to be chart ranking hits, however, in
actuality, the songs were not largely popular. Id.; see, e.g., Stilwell, supra note 20, at 394.
Indies used "paper adds" because a song that increases in its chart position is a positive
sign in the music industry that the song is popular, thus increasing the prospects that it
may become a lucrative hit for the record labels. Id.
67 j. Gregory Sidak & David E. Kronemyer, The "New Payola" and the American
Record Industry: Transactions Costs and PrecautionaryIgnorance in Contracts for Illicit
Services, 10 HARV. J. L. & PUB.POL'Y 521, 529 (1987); See id. (stating the indie's purpose
is to persuade radio station program directors to add particular records to playlists in
order to "increase the station's Arbitron market-share rating, thereby increasing demand
for advertising on that station"); see also Jane Scott, Exposing Rock's New Payola,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 2, 1991 at 33 (highlighting "The Network's"
tremendously influential role in music and radio industries and its ability "to keep records
off the air if the labels didn't 'pay up."').
68 See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 67, at 549 (quoting an industry CEO,
who said
that "the [indie] costs had become 'unbearable,' having increased during 'the last several
years ... four and five times what they once were..."); see also Stilwell, supra note 20, at
397 (noting that, by 1982, CBS Records had fired 300 employees and closed nine sales
branches, while spending at least $10 million on independent promotion).
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promoters for their services. 69 The Network exercised its
monopoly power to harm any record companies that attempted to
terminate their contracts with Network members.7 °
B. Payola Makes Headlines Again, But Still No Change
During the mid-1980s, a series of Los Angeles Times and
Billboard articles reported on the elusive indie promotion
practices and on record labels' efforts to control the "wildly
escalating costs of independent promotion. 7 1 In response, the
Senate Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations conducted
a three-month preliminary investigation concerning indie
promotion practices. 2 The Senate Subcommittee stated,
"Because of the enormous sums of money involved and the
manner in which record promotion ... operate[s,] there are
ample opportunities and incentives for improper or illegal
activities. 7 3 Despite these statements, the "staff uncovered no
credible evidence of specific incidents of improper or illegal
activity" and did not conduct a full-scale investigation into indie
69 See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 67, at 551 (stating that the Times reported that
record companies in 1983 feared that indie promoters would suppress airplay if they did
not buy independent promotion services); see also Zorn, supra note 56 (reporting that if a
major label refused to pay for indie services, it was popularly understood that powerful
indies could blacklist the label's records at certain radio stations or keep the label's songs
off trade publication reports for chart positions, "in effect discouraging other stations from
playing the song and keeping the record out of stores").
70 In
1980, Warner Communications Inc. (which includes Warner Bros.,
Electra/Asylum and Atlantic records) and CBS records (which includes Columbia, Portrait
and Epic) both announced that they were boycotting the indie stronghold and would no
longer continue to employ the services of indie promoters. As a result, both companies
experienced significant financial losses after the Network retaliated ... by arranging for
radio stations to stop playing singles by Warner Bros. and CBS artists. The boycott
abruptly ended in 1981 when both Warner and CBS returned to employing indie
promoters. See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 67, at 549-50; Stilwell, supra note 20, at
396.
71 Stilwell, supra note 20, at 397; see Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 67, at 551-52
(chronicling a series of expos6 articles written in the Los Angeles Times in 1983 on indie
practices).
72 See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 67, at 552 (stating that in response
to the
scandals reported in the Los Angeles Times, the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation launched a preliminary investigation of independent promotion in 1984);
Stilwell, supra note 20, at 397 (noting that in July 1984, the Subcommittee was in the
midst of a three-month investigation of independent promotion.).
71 Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 67, at 552 (declaring the findings of the Senate
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce (quoting Memorandum on Improper or Illegal Activities in the Record Industry
from the Subcommittee Staff to the Members of the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce 3 (Sept. 14, 1984)); see Stilwell,
supra note 20, at 397.
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payola practices. 4 Had Congress conducted a full investigation,
they would have discovered what everyone in the music and
radio industry already knew: indie promoters were acting as
conduits for record labels engaging in illegal payola practices.7 5
By 1986, the independent promotional payola scheme was
brought into the public eye after a NBC Nightly News
investigative report aired on the "New Payola. 76 The scandal
triggered grand jury investigations nationwide, singling out Los
Angeles kingpin indie promoter Joe Isgro, who was indicted on 57
felony counts, including bribery, racketeering, and conspiracy to
distribute cocaine. 77 Isgro pled guilty to a much lesser taxevasion charge, while the other payola-related racketeering
charges were dismissed. The investigation lasted nearly a decade
74 Responsibilities of Broadcasting Licensees, supra note 38,
at 1; see Sidak &
Kronemyer, supra note 67 at 552. The Subcommittee concluded that, "although paper
adds made the broadcast industry 'susceptible to improper relationships between
promoters and radio stations,' a full Senate investigation was unwarranted." Id. In 1991,
Jube Shiver Jr., of the Los Angeles Times, interviewed Charles W. Kelley, chief of the
enforcement division at the FCC. In response to the independent promotion regime
between indies and record labels and the payola allegations of the late 1980s, Mr. Kelley
stated, "'Assuming that there's no quid pro quo--assuming that the station is not
obligated to do something' for having prizes paid for by a promoter - 'the station doesn't
have to mention' who paid for them and the practice poses no legal problem, Kelley said.
'Then again,' he added rhetorically, 'why would they provide a prize unless there was a
quid pro quo?' Jube Shriver Jr., The Record Promoters Staging A Comeback;
Entertainment: The Independents Were Nearly Put Out of Business By A Payola Probe In
The '80s But Major Labels Are Quietly Rehiring Them, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1991, at D7.
"' See Stilwell, supra note 20, at 397. Motown Records' president wrote to the
president of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) urging the RIAA to
investigate indie practices stating, "We should be meeting about the high cost of trying to
get our records played on radio, which, to a great extent, has nothing to do with the
record's quality but rather with who pays the most." Id. at 397-98. Paradoxically, during
Congress' investigation into illegal payola practices, the FCC in July 1984, published its
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, in
an effort to increase deregulation of radio station ownership. Id. The FCC's marketplace
theory, which is the ideology of the radio industry, 'assumes that broadcasters will
inherently act in the public interest by adjusting their content to satisfy their audience's
preferences' for diverse programming." Id. The fact that this ideology was not working
should have triggered the FCC to take some remedial action instead of spearheading the
call to deregulation, which because of the monotonous sound on the radio, further
exasperated the payola problems. Id; The author explained the practice of payola among
independent promoters. Katunich, supra note 2, at 656.
76 Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 67 at 556. The news story alleged that the FBI and
police were investigating "corrupt practices in the rock music business, and what appears
to be re-emergence of payola at rock music radio stations." Id. See generally William K.
Knoedelseder, Jr., $1 Million in Suspected 'New Payola' is Probed; L.A. Grand Jury
Looking Into Payments by Record Promoters to Radio Programmers,But Activities May Be
Within Law, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1987, Part 1, at 1. The article reported the investigation
into the possible independent promoter payola scandal, noting that much of the activity,
while questionable, adhered to the law. Id.
" See Knoedelsedersupra note 76, at 1 (discussing the grand jury investigation into
Joe Isgro's activities as a promoter); see also Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 67, at 556.
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and cost the government an estimated $10 million dollars.7"
When the indie/payola scandal of 1986 first grabbed headlines,
the use of indies tapered off. However, with much smoke, but
little fire, the industry quietly began reverting back to its indie
payola ways after it became clear that major record labels would
federal government's short-lived music
not be harmed by the
79
industry investigation.
C. The Telecom Act of 1996 & CorporateRadio: Bigger Payola
Means Indies Win And Listeners Lose
For most of radio's early history, broadcasting stations
operated under the public trustee theory that airwaves are a
public resource and that radio stations were being granted a
privilege by the federal government.8 0 Under this ideology, "up
until the 1980s, FCC policy basically aimed to restrict ownership
concentration both locally and nationally. 8'' The FCC's goal was
to "relentlessly guard" against ownership concentration and to
"maximiz[e] the number of independent media voices."8 2 The
essence of the public trustee model was that broadcasting is a
18

See Boehlert, supra note 17, at 3 (stating that "legendary indie heavyweight Joe

Isgro battled prosecutors for nearly a decade over payola related charges."); see also
Chuck Phillips, Judge Dismisses Payola Charges Against Record Promoter Isgro, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996, at D1 (reporting that Isgro's recently dismissed case "had already
been dismissed once and revived [and] has ... cost the government an estimated $10
million to pursue.").
79 See Jeff Leeds, Music Promoter to Abandon a Radio Policy He Developed, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at C18 (explaining that there was an understood "quid pro qud' to
the "budget" system, under which the radio stations played the songs promoted by the
indie in exchange for accepting the "budget" from the indie); see also Shriver Jr., supra
note 74 at D7. The author details the reemergence of a payola system using innovative
methods: indies gave radio stations money in the form "budgets." Id. Radio stations used
the "budget" monies to pay for "promotional materials," and in exchange, would add songs
the indie was promoting to its playlist. Id. The indie would then bill the record companies
when the companies' songs were added to the stations playlist. Id.
"0 See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 116-20,
(1973) (describing the development of federal radio regulation in which Congress licensed
private radio broadcasters and treated them as "a 'public trustee' charged with the duty of
fairly and impartially informing the public audience."); see also Anthony E. Varona, Out
Of Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public Forum Analysis To Redeem American
Broadcasting Regulation, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149, 151 (2006) (noting that "[the
FCC] interpreted the public trustee doctrine as requiring that broadcast stations 'be
operated as if owned by the public ...As if people of a community should own a station
and turn it over to the best man in sight with this injunction: manage this station in our
interest."' (quoting The Federal Radio Commission and the Public Service Responsibility
of Broadcast Licensees, 11 J. Fed. Comm. B. Ass'n 5, 14 (1950))).
81 C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up On Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV.
839, 869 (2002).
82

Id.
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public good, to be 8 3used for public discourse and to increase
viewpoint diversity.
This ownership ideology in broadcasting started to change
during the 1980s, when the FCC encouraged federal deregulation
of broadcasting stations. A new ideology in broadcasting called
the marketplace model emerged, where economic competition
and market incentives were paramount and ownership viewpoint
diversity were afterthoughts.8 4 The marketplace model assumed
that an "unbounded and unprobed... market will purportedly
lead the concentrated but competitive firms to provide
audiences
85
with the variety and type of content they want.)
Congress further deregulated the broadcasting industry under
the marketplace model when it passed the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.6 The Act relaxed local ownership restrictions and
eliminated national and local ownership caps, allowing a single
company or entity to own up to eight radio stations in the largest
markets in the country.8 7 Under the Act, Congress believed that
a "deregulated marketplace would best serve public interest as
suggested by the Act's preface, which described its purpose as
'[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
deployment
of new
telecommunications
technologies." 8
83 See id. at 870 (stating that "[w]ide dispersal of ownership had previously been seen
in a sense, as a good in itself or, more programmatically, as the good of simply providing
for more independent voices, more opportunities to be broadcast 'speaker,' less
concentrated power over public opinion, as well as potentially more viewpoint diversity.");
see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr and A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancingthe Spectrum:
Media Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 814
(2000) (evaluating FCC regulation of the airwaves since its inception).
"4 See Baker, supra note 81, at 870 (asserting that "[n]ow, as long as competition
exists, wide dispersal of ownership is seen as unimportant in itself and possibly
inefficient. From this new perspective, the FCC appropriately allows multiple ownership
within a local community as long as an adequate number of competing firms continue to
prevent the concentrated firm from having monopoly power over advertising rates."); see
also Stilwell, supra note 20, at 370-372 (discussing the history and effects of passing the
Telecommunications Act of 1996).
85 Baker, supra note 81, at 870.
86 See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified by scattered section of 47 of the United States Code).
87 See id. at § 202(a); see also Prindle, supra note 64, at 294 (stating that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 relaxed local radio ownership restrictions and eliminated
the national ownership cap).
" See Anastasia Bednarski, From Diversity to Duplication Mega-Mergers and the
Failure of the Marketplace Model Under The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 55 FED.
COMM. L.J. 273, 275, 288 (2003) (codified by scattered section of 47 of the United States
Code) (explaining that the Act created an oligarchy of four companies: Chancellor Media,
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Consequently, many of the large broadcasting conglomerates
bought up numerous small and local radio stations around the
country, centralizing and consolidating broadcasting operations
in an effort to turn a profit.8 9 The focus became increasing
advertising revenue and replacing local, diverse programming
with centralized "cookie cutter formats" and monotonous
playlists dominated by market research. 90 As a result, access to
the airwaves became increasingly difficult as playlists became
tighter, and a very small number of corporate gatekeepers
controlled access to the public airwaves. 91 Broadcasters believed
that experimenting with new artists or songs was a risk that
could cause listeners to switch to a station playing an "older and
more comforting hit."92
Clear Channel, Infinity and Capstar, which owned a majority of the nation's radio
stations (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56));
Stilwell, supra note 20, at 404-05 (noting that "[t]he 1996 Act radically changed the
broadcasting marketplace, causing rapid consolidation of radio station ownership ... and
by 1997, '4,000 of the country's 11,000 radio stations changed hands."').
89 The FCC sought to deregulate broadcasting in radio and television under the laissez
faire ideology, with the idea that increased market competition would create a better
product for the public audience. See Randall R. Rainey & William Rehg, Market Place of
Ideas, The Public Interest, And Federal Regulation Of the Electronic Media: Implications
of Habermas' Theory of Democracy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1923, 1935 (1996) (discussing how
the FCC moved away from the public trust model and began to move toward free market
models); see Stilwell, supra note 20, at 369 (explaining that the FCC sought to deregulate
broadcasting in radio and television under the laissez faire ideology, with the idea that
increased market competition would create a better product for the public audience); see
also id. at 406 (quoting consumer advocate Ralph Nader's response to the FCC's actions in
the mid 90s as creating 'less diversity, more prepackaged programming, and fewer checks
on political power.").
90 See Stilwell, supra note 20, at 415 (stating that "[c]onsolidation has led to radio
stations that 'systematically exclude music that [research shows] provokes the strongest
reaction - positive or negative - resulting in a music mix' at terrestrial radio that is
homogenized and predictable."); see also Adam J. Van Alystyne, Clear Control: An
Antitrust Analysis Of Clear Channel's Radio And Concert Empire, 88 MINN. L. REV. 627,
660 (2004) (explaining that as a result of ownership consolidation, "it is safer for the
station to remain consistent in its play list... [bly only adding a few new songs, the
station does not risk offending an advertiser or losing a regular listener who likes to hear
familiar artists and songs.").
9' See David Hinckley, Report Says Format Choice is Too Limited, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 19, 2002, Television Section, at 108, available at http://www.futureofmusic.org
/images/pressclips.radiostudy.pdf; see also Stilwell, supra note 20, at 417 ('Each year,
thousands of new songs are released by record labels, but only 250 or so tunes are added
per station,' making airplay very valuable to record labels.") (quoting Jeff Leeds,
Middlemen Put Price on Airplay, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at Cl).
92 See Chris Parker, Gimme 'Indie' Rock, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/music/0711,parker,76030,22.html ("Why is it that only 10
percent of the spins at radio are from the independents, whereas 30 percent of the sales
are from independent [artists] ... [i]t's obvious enough-its because of payola." (quoting
Tommy Silverman, CEO and Founder of Tommy Boy Records)); see also Paul F. Roberts,
The Fate of Indie Music as We Know It, SALON, Mar. 20, 2007, http://www.salon.com
/news/feature/2007/03/20/copyrightroyalty-boardlprint.html (stating that "[t]he lack of
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i. The Telecom Act of '96: New Tricks, But Same Old Payola
The mid-90s wave of consolidation in radio facilitated and
encouraged payola. Since new radio conglomerates were hungry
for revenue to fund the expensive consolidation process, "the
natural result of consolidation [from the '96 Act] ... pressured
both station owners and record companies to turn to payola for a
quick solution. 9 3 Record label executives negotiated large scale
promotion deals which resulted in airplay across a large number
of stations that could reach numerous geographic markets. 94
In addition to furnishing money and other valuable
consideration to radio programmers, record labels attempted to
boost the popularity of their artists by purchasing "spin
programs" or adding songs for lunar rotations. Spin programs
are airtime bought by record labels that are marketed as
advertisements, but are really used to increase the amount of
spins a label's song receives on a particular radio station. 95 This
type of practice is another attempt by record labels to circumvent
payola laws by purchasing advertising time on radio stations and
variety and the prevalence of pay for play has made life difficult for up-and-coming
bands."); see also Otis Hart, FCC Deal May Open Doors for Independent Music in Radio But How Much Will Really Change?, RELISH, Jan. 25, 2007, available at
http://www.journalnow.comlservlet/Satellite?pagename=WSJ%2FMGArticle%2FWSJ_Rel
ishArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=l 149192810711&path=!entertainment!general!&s=1037645
508970 ("[L]ess than [ten] percent of the content on commercial radio is independently
produced, even though [eighty] percent of the records released in America come from
independent labels ... [t]his might have something to do with radio playlists overlapping
by up to ninety-seven percent ....).
93 Katunich, supra note 2, at 654.
94 "As radio groups became more consolidated .. the balance of power between radio
and record labels shifted from the record labels to the radio group owners. Radio
executives re-examined what they could get out of record companies by using the most
ruthless of independent promoters as middlemen... " Stilwell, supra note 20, at 419. The
record companies no longer had to "line the pockets of DJs and program directors in
individual markets spread across the country;" now they could strike deals with
executives of media conglomerates that would increase national airplay across the
corporation's entire group of stations. See Nowlin, supra note 5.
95 See Jeff Leeds, Paid 'ads'forsong plays revive payola memories, L.A. TIMES, Jun, 11,
2004, available at http://www.boycott-riaa.com/article/print/12499. During a single week
in May 2004, pop artist Avril Lavigne's song 'Don't Tell Me" aired 109 times on Nashville
radio station WQZQ-FM, from the hours between midnight and 6 a.m. Id. Arista Records
paid the station to play the song as an advertisement under the spin program and "on one
Sunday morning, the three-minute, 24 second song aired 18 times, sometimes as little as
11 minutes apart." Id.; see Glen Gamboa, "Declarationof Independents," NEWSDAY, Mar.
18,
2007,
available
at
http://www.newsday.com
entertainment/music
/nyffcol5130817mar18,0,90982.column?col=ny-music-print.
Garett Michaels, program
director of San Diego rock station KBZT-FM stated, "playing songs as advertising makes
'the chart unreliable'... Basically, the radio station isn't playing a song because they
believe in it. They're playing it because they're being paid." Id.
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using that money instead to induce radio stations to play the
labels' songs. 96 Lunar rotation occurs when a label purchases
airtime for their songs, enabling a radio station to play a song
multiple times in the late night hours to help the song's chart
position. 97 Songs are credited as being played by radio stations
even though they are not really added to that station's peak
programming playlist. 98 "By engaging in such elaborate schemes
to purchase airplay, increase spins and manipulate the
charts,... record labels present the public with a skewed picture
of the country's 'best' and 'most popular' recorded music. 9 9
ii. Labels Stuck In An Indie/Payola Prisoner's Dilemma
As a result of consolidation, a more "insidious kind of payola"
developed, as record labels intensely competed for the small
number of valuable play list openings. 0 0 Record companies only
get twelve weeks for a song to get any "traction" on the radio

96 Id. This method is also deceptive because again, it exploits the radio system to give

the illusion that certain songs are popular and worthy to be played on the radio, while it
excludes other songs from independent labels from being played because they cannot
compete with the financial power of the big record labels.
97 See Boehlert, supra note 17. The "paper add" practices of the 60s, 70s and 80s
are no
longer a viable option since all radio stations are now electronically monitored by a
company called the Broadcast Data Service (BDS), which gives labels a detailed readout
of songs actually played on the air. To circumvent the process, and to increase the
appearance of playlist adds by a label's artist, many radio stations will add songs to their
lunar rotations. These songs are detected by the BDS, but do not have an effect on the
station's ratings or playlist because they are played at such odd hours of the night when
audience numbers are at its lowest. Id.
98 "Radio stations must play a song many thousands of times for it to crack the
Billboard top 10. Nonetheless, a few hundred spins here and there can move a song up a
place or two in the rankings ....
Leeds, supra note 95, at 1; see Stephen Holden, The Pop
Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991 at C12 (explaining how Billboard uses radio airplay as a
factor in determining the top songs and albums).
99 WMG Acquisition Corp., et al., EX-99.1 Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to
Executive Law § 63(15) (Nov. 22, 2005), available at http://www.secinfo.com
dl4D5a.z71n2.d.htm at 6 (noting that in an effort to increase spins and popularity of a
particular song, many labels paid people or directed their own employees to place
fraudulent requests for songs to be played at radio stations).
100 See Nowlin, supra note 5. Paul Porter, founder of Industry Ears, describes the
payola scheme before and after the 1996 Act:
It used to be, 'I'll give you $200 and a bag of cocaine ...and a hooker if you play
this record.' But at least back then it was up to an individual to make the decision
whether to play it. Now the money has gotten so much bigger, that it's the blue suits
making the deals. It's not just coaxing one guy in a control room. Id.
See also L.A. Lorek, N.Y. Prober on Prowl for Payola; Clear Channel Reminds
Employees It Forbids Pay-for-play Schemes, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 25, 2005
at 1E (explaining that payola schemes come back in different forms through time).
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before the next wave of record company singles are introduced.'o
Radio industry insider and long time artist manager, Ron Stone
stated, "[I]f you don't have any traction you get washed away...
[n]ow it [has] become even more complicated and expensive
because of consolidation." 10 2 Because of the millions of dollars
record labels put into their artists, the radio and music industry
has become "a high-stakes poker game," which the indies have
been "winning... for decades by playing off record industry
insecurities.' ' 3
Today, the top three broadcasters control at least 60 percent of
the radio stations in the top markets in the U.S.10 4 As that
happened a change in payola practices took place. Under the
modern payola scheme, indie promotion became corporate big
business. 10 5 "Drugs and hookers . .. [were] out; detailed invoices
[billed to the labels by indie promoters were] in."10 6 As media
conglomerates like Clear Channel began buying up more and
more radio stations, indie promoters began charging higher and
higher fees to record labels in order to get their songs on the
tighter playlists. Many indie promoters working on behalf of
record labels charged as much as $5,000 for a song to be added on
a radio station's play list. 10 7 As a result of the '96 Telecom Act,
101See Boehlert, supra note 17, at 3 (discussing how independent record promoters are
middle men between record companies and radio stations, and pay hundreds of millions of
dollars each year in order to get songs played on the radio); see also Laura M. Holson,
With By-the-numbers Radio, Requests Are a Dying Breed, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 11, 2002 at C1
(commenting on the fact that songs have relatively little time to gain a popular following
before they are eliminated from play lists).
102 Boehlert, supra note 17, at 3.
10' See
Eric
Boehlert,
Fighting Pay-for-Play, SALON,
Apr.
3,
2001,
http://www.salon.com/ent/music/feature/2001/04/03/payola2/print.html
(elaborating on
pressure record companies are under to ensure their songs are added to radio playlists
and further describing songs that do not rise up the charts as "the kiss of death."); see also
Boehlert, supra note 17 (quoting Ron Stone, artist manager who describes independent
promoters as "an important insurance policy" for his clients).
104 See id. (noting that the top three broadcasters control the majority of U.S. stations
in the market).
'05See Jeff Leeds, Small Record Labels Say Radio Tunes Them Out, L.A. TIMES, Sep.
16, 2001, at Business 1 (listing the cost of independent promoters' services to record
companies at $100 million per year); see also Industry Ears Press Release, supra note 10
(describing Payola's evolution "Payola is no longer just the little guy getting a few bucks
for a few spins on the radio-the 'new' payola is corporately overseen and driven-a
multi-million dollar business.").
106 Boehlert, supra note 17.
107 See Boehlert, supra note 60 (positing that every song on a radio playlist comes with
a price attached that is dependent on the market, with prices reaching as much as $5,000
in large markets); see also Neil Strauss, Pay-for-Play Back on the Air But This Rendition
Is Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1998, at Al (claiming that Flip/Interscope Records agreed
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indies did much less work for much more money. In the years
following the '96 Act, labels attempted to recoup their losses and
music sales began to slump; suddenly record labels were not so
eager to pay the "staggering" prices indies were charging to do
less and less work.10 8
Although record labels were displeased with the high price of
indie promotion, the labels continued to tolerate it because they
needed indies as a buffer between them and the anti-payola
laws. 10 9 Additionally, the labels were afraid of the ramifications if
they crossed indies and stopped paying them.1 10 "Record
companies had given birth to their own prisoner's dilemma:
either continue to pay whatever fees the indies demand[ed] or
eliminate their existence . . . [a]s history dictates, the latter [was]
not an option."11' 1 Indies had leverage over record labels because
of the long standing relationships they formed with radio
programmers, and the financial alliances with station managers.
Labels paid indies not only for what they could do to get a song
on the air, but also out of fear of any influence indies possessed in
keeping a song off the air.11 2 Labels were frustrated with the
system that they had helped create, yet there was little they

to pay KUFO-FM approximately $5,000 to play a song by a new artists 50 times in a
single week).
17 (stating "[iln effect, [indies] have become an
1o8 See Boehlert, supra note
extraordinarily expensive phalanx of toll collectors who bill the record company every
time a new song is added to a station's play list... no other entertainment industry vests
so much power and pays so much money to outside sources [(indies)] who do so little
work."); see also Nowlin, supra note 5 (explaining how the 1996 Telecom Act lifted
regulations on media businesses, allowing for significant consolidation among U.S. radio
stations.).
109 See Katunich, supra note 2, at 660 ("[m]usic industry may have successfully shifted
the legal risk of violating payola laws onto independent promoters, but in doing so, they
may have become a slave of their own design."); see also Jacob Slichter, The Priceof Fame,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 29, 2005 at A23 (noting that because indies pay radio stations upfront
and later collect from the record labels, who ultimately take it out of the artists' earnings,
"the lines are sufficiently blurred," making it hard to prove any payola occurred).
110 See Katunich, supra note 2, at 661 (explaining that record labels need indies to
ensure that they will be working with the labels and not against them); see also Nowlin,
supra note 5 (positing that payola, despite the challenges it faces, is a problem that will
likely never go away due to its prevalence in the broadcasting industry.).
'
Katunich, supra note 2, at 661.
112 See Boehlert, supra note 17 (asserting that despite complaints regarding the
current independent promotion practices, record labels still made sure the indies got paid
simply based on the fear that "not playing and paying might cost them crucial radio
airplay."); see also Katunich, supra note 2, at 657 ("[t]he persuasive techniques employed and the rising costs of such techniques - now have the industry questioning whether
indies are still worth their weight in gold.").
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could do to fix it. 113 "Without airplay, the chances of CD sales
diminish greatly ... [s]o labels are desperate to maintain
momentum behind new songs often at any cost... [a]nd the
indies know it."' " 4 As one record label employee frankly stated,
"If you have to pay [an indie] $10,000
to shut your boss up,
' 15
goddamn it, you pay let me tell you."
Eventually as music sales began to dwindle"16 and listener
dissatisfaction grew as a result of the same tired songs being
played on standard playlists across the nation, public outcry
against radio and payola practices began to grow larger and more
apparent.1 7 As Eric Boehlert of Salon magazine reported in
2001: "[There is an] obscene amount of abuse that's going on. It's
just wrong. We need regulators to look at it, someone who stands
up and says this stinks. Because the airwaves belong to the
public, they're federally licensed. You can't do anything you want
with them."' 18 As a result of increased news coverage, and public
complaints,"1 9 the anti-payola sentiment began picking up steam
in Washington as well.1 20 Many politicians actively spoke out
113

"Everyone tolerated payola when you were getting something in return," however,

as record labels eventually became frustrated with the crooked system they had created,
"[iut became untenable." Eric Boehlert, Payola is dead! Now what will we listen to?,
SALON, Jan. 5, 2005, http://archive.salon.comlnews/feature/2005/01/05/payolalprint.html.
"[B]ecause of unprecedented consolidation in the radio industry, a handful of large
broadcast groups and their exclusive indies broker unprecedented power. That makes the
record companies nervous. Indie promotion is costing them in excess of $100 million each
year." Boehlert, supra note 60.
114 Boehlert, supra note 113.
116
16

Id.

"Listenership has been dropping since 2003. And after posting double-digit growth
rates for most of the 1990s, radio ad sales have slowed to a barely perceptible crawl: Last
year advertising revenue climbed just 2%, to $21.4 billion." Peter Kafka, Radio Daze,
FORBES, Aug. 9, 2005, available at http://www.forbes.com/digitalentertainment
/2005/08/09/radio-programming-music-cxpkO809radio.html. The practice of undisclosed
paying for airplay results in mediocre radio, as songs are played based on the will of the
highest bidder and not on merit, sales, or requests. See Katunich, supra note 2, at 671.
11 "Radio's not about the music anymore... [a]nd it's becoming less special every day
in many places." says Glenn Gardner operations manager at WJJO in Madison Wisconsin.
Boehlert, supra note 103. Radio audiences are continually shrinking as fans tune into
more appealing sources, like Internet and satellite radio. See id.
's Boehlert, supra note 17; see Kafka, supra note 116 (recognizing the detrimental
effects of payola on listenership).
119 See Boehlert, supra note 17 (discussing how growing discontent with payola
practices among music industry insiders has drawn the attention of United States
government's regulatory agencies.); see also Martin Miller, Scandals and New
Technologies Signal a Staticky Failure, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 3, 2005, at C3 (stating that
payola practices have subjected the radio industry to "bad publicity").
120 See generally Statement of Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein Before the Federal
Communications Bar Association (Nov. 5, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov
/edocs.public/attachmatchDOC-240871Al.pdf
[hereinafter Adelstein Statement to
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against payola 12
in1 the music industry and criticized the FCC for
its lax attitude.
Notwithstanding the numerous statements against payola
123
practices in radio,'2 2 the FCC failed to take any action.
Perhaps one of the crippling aspects facing the FCC is the lack of
formal complaints made to the FCC regarding payola, and "since
the new payola has become a... part of the day-to-day business
at nearly every pop station in America, who's going to
complain?"' 24 What the industry needed was to "get out brooms
and flashlights and go through the entire closet... [and conduct]
evidentiary hearings to find out who did what, and how much
they paid.' 2 5
D. New York Sheds Some Light At the End of the Corruptive
Payola Tunnel
In 2003, former New York State Attorney General Elliot
Spitzer launched an aggressive statewide investigation into the
payola radio practices of four major record companies: Universal
Music, Warner, EMI and Sony BMG.1 26 The investigation
FCBA]; John Engen, Financial CHAR-AID, Vol. 117, Issue I, Jul. 1, 2007, at C30
(claiming payola in the music industry has weakened its influence on Washington
politics).
121 See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 1; see also Miller, supra note 119.
122 In 1999, Charles Kelly, chief of enforcement in the mass media bureau of the FCC,
said the new promotional practices could pose potential problems for the companies
involved, and that it would "certainly [be] an area that [the FCC] could pursue .... "
Chuck Philips & Michael A Hiltzik, 2 Officials Urge FCC to Probe Possible Payola, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 1999, at C1. In 2003, Chairman Jonathan Adelstein stated that payola
was "a serious problem that has become institutionalized across a number of [radio]
formats." However, he also stated that there was "not enough hard evidence to determine
what actions [the FCC] might need to take." See Adelstein Statement to FCBA, supra note
120. In 2005, FCC Chairman Kevin Martin promised "swift action" by the FCC in
response to the "widespread and flagrant violation" of FCC rules. Rosenthal, supranote 9.
123 In 2002, Representative for House Judiciary Committee, John Conyers Jr. stated,
"The [payola] problem has been growing since the Telecommunications Act. The
protections for the airwaves just aren't the same anymore. There is not enough oversight
of these kinds of transactions. The government has been snoozing." See Phillips, supra
note 1; see also Greg Kot, Music Industry Raises its Voice for Radio Reforms, CHI.
TRIBUNE, May 23, 2002, at N1.
124 Because of the Telecom Act, indie promotion was successful in skirting antiquated
payola laws. Industry insiders were well aware of the questionable and downright illegal
payola practices that labels and radio stations were engaging in, yet everyone involved
from the artists, to the labels, to the radio executives were extremely reluctant to take
any affirmative steps to remedy the problem. Boehlert, supra note 103.
125 Boehlert, supra note 60.
126 The Spitzer investigation may have been prompted by the hiring of Susanna
Zwerling, who spearheaded the investigation. Zwerling is an attorney whose previous job
was legal adviser to Democratic FCC Commissioner Michael Copps. See Bill Werde,
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uncovered incriminating e-mails between the major labels and
indie promoters promising radio stations trips, concert tickets
12 7
and other valuable consideration in exchange for radio airplay.
In response to the investigations, Spitzer stated, "Consumers
have a right not to be misled by the way in which the music they
hear on the radio is selected. . . [p]ay-for-play makes a mockery
of claims that only the 'best' or 'most popular' music is
broadcast." 128 The investigations revealed "a kind of grass-roots
collusion" amongst the major record companies,
who
supplemented radio programmers' pay and station budgets in
exchange for record spins.1 29 Additionally, the investigations
revealed station employees' participation in the acquisition and
concealment of such valuable consideration furnished 3 0by the
record labels-a blatant violation of the anti-payola laws.'
By the end of 2006, Spitzer's investigations led to over $36
million in fines against the four record companies as well as an
acknowledgement of improper conduct by the labels and a pledge
31
to cease payola practices and abide by a higher standard.
Spitzer stated, "Our investigation shows that... [a]irtime is
often determined by undisclosed payoffs to radio stations and
Payola Probe Heating Up, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/6590977/payola-probe heating up.
Spitzer's
"tenacious pursuit not only netted a lot of money and pledges of reform, but it forced the
federal government to stop looking the other way." See Parker, supra note 92.
127 See id. (asserting that Spitzer's investigation uncovered e-mails detailing the
exchange of concert tickets and "personal booty" for airplay); see also Jeff Leeds & Louise
Story, Radio Payoffs Are Described As Sony Settles, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2005 at Al
(noting the extent of payola discovered in e-mails and documents uncovered during
Spitzer's investigation).
128 Press Release, New York State Office of the Attorney General, Universal Music
Settles Payola Probe (May 11, 2006), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us./press
/2006/may/mayl la_06.html) [hereinafter Universal Settlement Press Release].
129 Underwood, supra note 8.
130 See Press Release, New York State Office of the Attorney General, Sony Settles
Payola Investigation (Jul. 25, 2005) available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us./press
/2005/julljul25aO5.html [hereinafter Sony Settlement Press Release] (finding that Sony
BMG employees took steps to conceal payments by record labels by using fictitious contest
winners to make it appear as though such payments were going to listeners and not to
station employees).
131 See Michael Gormley, Warner Settles in Spitzer 'Payola'Probe, ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
Nov. 23, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1132653913397&rss
=newswire (discussing how four record labels were required to pay the Rockefeller
Philanthropy Advisors to New York State to fund music programs in the state and stating
that "Spitzer said he hadn't sought criminal charges in the Sony case because criminal
laws governing pay-for-play are more specific and difficult to violate than the civil laws");
Stilwell, supra note 20, at 422-25 (discussing how the four radio groups banned
independent promotions and later received subpoenas from New York Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer).
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their employees ... [and] [t]his agreement is a model for
breaking the pervasive influence of bribes in the industry." 132 As
Elliot Spitzer began compiling more and more evidence of payola
practices and his investigations grabbed both national and local
13
3
headlines, many politicians, 1 journalists and music artists 1
began calling for some nation-wide action by the FCC. 135 "After
Spitzer turned over his findings to the FCC, there was talk
among some industry watchers that the Justice Department
might get involved and that payola would be taken seriously at
the federal level." 136 Although the FCC promised to take swift
action and applauded Mr. Spitzer's actions in finally uncovering
the "real fire"
among much smoke, the FCC was slow to respond
137
once again.
132

Sony Settlement Press Release, supra note 130 (quoting Eliot Spitzer).

133 Senator Russell Feingold (D-WI) weighed in on the FCC payola investigation

stating that despite "pressure on the FCC to come up with a quick resolution," it was
important that "any settlement provide a strong message that payola will not be tolerated
in any form." Sen. Feingold Calls For Strong Consent Decree On Payola, FMQB, Jan. 31,
2007, http://www.fmqb.com/Article.asp?t=p&id=342981.
He
also suggested that
investigators from the New York Attorney General's office be invited to testify and
participate in any investigation. Id.; see Bill Holland, Senator Introduces Payola Bill,
BILLBOARD, Nov. 21, 2005, available at http://www.recordingartistscoalition.com
/press.php?content id=137584.
134 See Slichter, supra note 109. Slichter is a member of the pop band Semisonic, who
had a hit song in the late 1990s called "Closing Time." Id. He applauded Spitzer's acts
stating: "Knowing what it takes to get their songs on the radio and watching their share
of record sales swallowed up along the way, most recording artists would love to see the
current system brought down .... Id.
135 Eliot Spitzer criticized the FCC's lack of involvement after his investigations
revealed rampant payola in New York radio. See Press Release, New York State Office of
the Attorney General, Radio Giant Named in PayolaLawsuit (Mar. 8, 2006), available at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/mar/marO8a_06.html
[hereinafter Radio Giant
Press Release]. "Almost a year after payola was exposed in significant detail, the FCC has
yet to respond in any meaningful way. The agency's inaction is especially disappointing
given the pervasive nature of this problem and its corrosive impact on the entertainment
industry." Id.; see Brian Ross, Richard Esposito & Vic Walter, lOOs of Radio Stations in
Payola Probe, ABC NEWS, Feb. 9, 2006, available at http://abcnews.go.comlBusiness
/story?id=1600966&page--1.
136 See Brian Ross & Vic Walter, Paying to Make It to the Top of the Charts,
ABC
NEWS, Feb. 16, 2006, http:/labcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=1628380&page=l
(stating that penalties for violations could include loss of license); Neda Ulaby, Rumored
FCC Payola Settlement Angers Critics, NAT'L PUB RADIO, Jan. 22, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=6944954 (noting that if violations
of "federal payola rules are found" in a possible FCC probe, many believed that, in
addition to civil fines, "radio broadcast licenses could be at stake").
137 See Rosenthal, supra note 9. FCC Chairman Kevin Martin promised "swift action,"
yet "[t]he urgency of Martin's comment... was undercut by the fact that... [the FCC]
seemed slow to answer [Commissioner Adelstein's] ... call for the FCC to follow
Spitzer's... investigation." Id. When the Sony settlement was reached with New York's
Office of Attorney General, Chairman Adelstein stated he had "seen a lot of smoke around
payola for a while, but now we know it's coming from a real fire." Id. He went on to say
that 'Mr. Spitzer's office has collected a mountain of evidence on the potentially illegal
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When the FCC finally decided to roll up its sleeves and began
investigating, it's inquiry paled in comparison to Elliot Spitzer's
New York investigation.1 38 Rather than continuing Mr. Spitzer's
investigation into payola as promised, the commission took the
easy way out, entering into a consent decree with a majority of
the broadcasting companies on April 13, 2007.139 Under the FCC
consent decree, four of the nation's six largest radio station
owners 140 agreed to close scrutiny in their dealings with record
companies for the next three years and were fined a total of $12.5
million."' The settlement terms included "limits on gifts, a
promise to keep a database of all items of value supplied by those
companies, the employment of independent compliance officers to
make sure stations are following the rules and even a 'payola
hotline' for employees.' 4 2 In addition to the proposed terms, a
separate "good faith agreement"1 43 was reached with a group of
independent record labels under, the umbrella group American
Association of Independent Music (A2IM). The agreement with
promotion practices of ... major record companies, independent promoters and several of
the largest radio station groups." Id.; see Government to Examine Payola, Vows Action,
Fox NEWS, Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/O,2933,165168,00.html.
13s See Douglas Wolk, The Other Foot, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/music/0534,soti,67086,22.html (asserting that the FCC's
investigation consisted of issuing a fact sheet on payola, which asks listeners to report
unidentified examples of pay-for-play, but that this is ineffective because the problem
with payola is that people can't tell when they are hearing it); see also Press Release, U.S.
Senator Russ Feingold Wisconsin (D-WI), Feingold Presses FCC Answers on Payola
Investigation (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://feingold.senate.gov/-feingold/releases
/06/11/20061101.html (discussing Senator Feingold's letter to the FCC urging the
Commission to exert more authority in conducting payola investigation).
139 See Federal Communications Commission, Payola and Sponsorship Identification,
http://www.fcc.gov/ebfbroadcast/sponsid.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2007) [hereinafter
Payola and Sponsorship] (listing consent decrees against Clear Channel Communications
Inc., CBS Radio Inc., Citadel Broadcasting Corp., and Entercom Communications Corp);
Industry Ears Press Release, supra note 10 (acknowledging consent decree agreed upon
by the FCC and the owners of Clear Channel, CBS, Entercom and Citadel radio broadcast
companies).
140 These include Clear Channel, CBS Radio, Entercom Communications and Citadel
Broadcasting. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
141 See Dunbar, supra note 10 (outlining settlement agreement between the FCC
and
four radio broadcast companies, including: Clear Channel, CBS Radio, Entercom, and
Citadel Broadcasting; noting that none of the radio stations stipulated to any wrongdoing
under the settlement decree); see also Radio Has the FCC Playing the Tunes, supra note
139.
142 See Industry Ears Press Release, supra note 10; see also Dunbar, supra note 10.
143 See Parker, supra note 92 (noting that FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein
confirmed that good faith agreement was outside the agency's purview, as he claimed "[i]t
may not be something our rules can address directly"); see also Industry Ears Press
Release, supra note 10 (stating that "[t]h[is] good faith agreement is not enforceable by
law" and broadcasters will not be held accountable).
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A2IM included 4,200 hours of free airtime for independent record
labels and local artists over three years. 4 4
In the end, the independent music settlement has been
characterized as "a drop in an empty bucket of promises."'14 Ben
Goldberg, the founder of independent record label Ba Da Bing
Records, believes that despite independent exposure, the only
beneficiaries of the settlement are "independent labels with
major-label affiliations."'4 6. He states, "These labels will have
major distribution, major promotion, but will look like separate
business entities ... [i]t will be a complete wash."'147 The radio
broadcasters offered a "shameless sop" of incorporating a halfhour radio show for independent music only. 148 However, there is
already skepticism with respect to this radio show, (that was
originally planned for 90 minutes in duration) which "has [now]
slid back to a mere. .. [approximately twenty] minutes of actual
49
music... without a guarantee it will even be locally produced."'
In response to the consent decree, FCC Commissioner
Jonathan Adelstein stated, "While this settlement is not a
panacea to all payola woes, it requires the implementation of
certain meaningful reform measures that should change
corporate practices and behavior."' 150 Although many saw the
consent decree as a positive step in the right direction towards
ending payola, many others felt the settlement was not enough.
Craig Aaron, Communications Director for the public advocacy
group, Free Press states, "This settlement... sends a strong
144 See Dunbar, supra note 10 ("The free airtime, between 6 a.m. and midnight, would
be granted to [small, independent labels] not owned or controlled by the nation's four
dominant music labels .... ); see also Chris Parker, The Price of Payola: Someone's

Listening

After

All,

PHOENIX

NEW

TIMES,

Apr.

12

2007,

available

at

http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2007-04-12/music/the-price-of-payola
(reporting that
part of the agreement broadcasters made with the American Association of Independent
Music was "a once-a-week, half-hour radio show of 'indie' music chain-wide").
145 See Parker, supra note 92.
146 Hart, supra note 92.
147 Id.
148 See

Parker, supra note 92 (positing that the offer is merely a ploy to quiet the
payola scene); see also Hart, supra note 92 (stating that the parties that stand to benefit
are independent labels with major-label affiliations.).
149 See Parker, supra note 92 (implying that, in actuality, independent
music is
receiving less airtime than provided by the agreement); see also Will the FCC Payola
Settlement Matter?, Hypebot.com, Mar. 8, 2007, http://hypebot.typepad.com/hypebot/2007
/03/will thefccpa.html (arguing that the settlement agreement to increase playing time
of independent music is unlikely to "level the playing field" with corporate radio
practices).
15o See Dunbar, supra note 10 (quoting FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein).
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message.. . [b]ut just like in any industry, these things go in
cycles... [a]nd as soon as the spotlight moves away, you can be
sure that something like payola will start again."'5 1
III. THE AFTERMATH-WHAT CAN BE DONE
If history is an accurate indicator, the current settlement will
merely be just another bump in the road for payola and its
players. What looked to be a national overhaul of the radio
industry after Elliot Spitzer's investigations turned out to be
nothing more than a blip on the radar screen as the FCC "settled
their investigation before they even began; ignoring the severity
of corruption in the music industry." 152 Although the $12.5
million fine imposed by the FCC is the second largest fine ever
levied by the regulatory agency, it is not enough. 15 3 As compared
to the hundreds of millions of dollars that record labels, indie
promoters and even broadcasters have made from payola, the
fine imposed by the FCC is merely a slap on the wrist.
Furthermore, Elliot Spitzer's local investigation levied $36
million in fines against payola practices in New York State, yet
the FCC is only fining the same groups $12.5 million for the
entire country.15 The settlement agreement does nothing to
actually curb or even attempt to end the pay-for-play practices in
radio; in fact, the terms of the agreement do not even require the
broadcasters to admit any wrongdoing whatsoever. 55 As
"' See Underwood, supra note 8.
See Industry Ears Press Release, supra note 10 (noting the industry's reluctance to
alter the status quo of current payola practices (quoting Paul Porter, Industry Ears CoFounder)); see also Will the FCC Payola Settlement Matter?, supra note 149 (arguing that
the settlement agreement is "hardly a harsh punishment").
153 See Industry Ears Press Release, supra note 10 ('The reported payola
consent
decree does nothing to slow radio and records commitment for the pay for play system"
(quoting Paul Porter, Co-Founder, Industry Ears)); see also Rachelle Younglai, Radio
Firms to Pay $12.5 Million Fine, REUTERS, Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article
/ousiv/idUSN0532493820070306 (reporting that fine was largest fine collectively levied
against industry).
154 See Paul Porter Interview, supra note 9 (stating that the federal fines levied by the
FCC amounts to much less than fines levied as a result of investigations launched by
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer); see also Parker, supra note 92 (noting that Elliot
Spitzer's investigations against payola netted more than $35 million in settlements from
the four major record labels and two broadcasters).
'55"For your ills, we're going to smack you on the wrist and make you do what you
should've been doing in the first place." See Parker, supra note 92 (quoting USC professor
and former radio programmer Jerry Del Calliano). Ending payola abuse requires more
than the wrist slap that the FCC has handed down. "The FCC must ensure that the
stations caught with illegal gifts in hand admit wrongdoing and pay stiff financial
152
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longtime anti-payola activist and music industry insider Paul
Porter states, "Payola won't stop unless people start going to jail
or losing jobs. ' 156 Even FCC commissioner Jonathan Adelstein
stated that, "The settlements aren't expected to end payola...
[s]ome dishonest employees may continue to take money 'under
the table.' 15 7 If the FCC's own personnel are admitting that this
settlement agreement will not really stop payola, then the FCC
must do more. It must undertake an actual investigation or
impose a substantial fine in order to finally end payola once and
for all. 158 As Lisa Fager, president and co-founder of the music
coalition Industry Ears stated, "The RIAA gets the government to
do more to poor college kids than the FCC does to billion-dollar
broadcast corporations who have clearly broke federal laws and
abused public airwaves." 15 9 If a trade group like the RIAA, can
severely punish its own customers for illegal downloading and
file sharing of music, 6 ' then a federal investigatory commission
should be able to do the same with multi-billion dollar record
labels.

penalties. All stations must adhere to strict reporting requirements and third-party
audits and open airwaves to independent artists and local music." Press Release,
CommonDreams.org, Slap On The Wrist Won't Stop Payola (Jan. 24, 2007), available at
http://www.commondreams.org/news2007/0124-02.htm
[hereinafter Common Dreams
Press Release] (quoting Franie Wellings, associate policy director at Free Press).
156 Meena Thiruvengadam, FCC payola fines reach $12.5 million, (Apr. 13, 2007),
available
at
http://www.industryears.comliearticles.php?subaction=showfull&id=
1176561708&archive=&startfrom=&ucat=l&.
157

Id.

"The consent decree... by the FCC once again shows the power of lobbyists (from
the radio stations and record labels] in Washington D.C. and the continued deteriorating
power by the public and its best interest." Industry Ears Press Release, supra note 10.
1'59 Id. The Recording Industry Association of America is a trade group that acts as a
lobbyist group for recording artists and record labels. See id. Both Industry Ears and
Future of Music Coalition have listed guidelines that would make any consent decree a
meaningful and acceptable punishment. See Common Dreams Press Release, supra note
155; see also Press Release, Future of Music Coalition, Future of Music Coalition
Statement
on
FCC
Payola
Settlement
(Jan.
16,
2007),
available at
http://www.futureofmusic.org/news/FCCpayolaconsentdecree07.cfm.
'60 Hundreds of copyright infringement suits were brought by the RIAA beginning in
2003 against teenagers who illegally downloaded music onto their computers. See John
Borland, RL4A Sues 261 File Swappers, CNET, Sept. 8, 2003, http://news.com.com21001023_3-5072564.html. Most of the lawsuits were settled for tens of thousands of dollars,
rather than actually litigated. Many of the defendants named in the lawsuits were college
students; however, some were as young as twelve years old. See 12-Year-Old Sued For
Music Downloading, Fox NEWS, Sept. 9, 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story
/0,2933,96797,00.html.
115
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A. The FederalGovernment Is Not Doing Its Job
"The payola of today is a natural and creative response to laws
that [aimed] ...to bring about its demise but in practice failed to
provide adequate weaponry."' 6 1 One of the main problems is that
the FCC lacks the man power to adequately investigate any sort
of payola practices engaged by large radio conglomerates with
powerful political influence.' 62 To date, the FCC has only imposed
one fine on a major radio group. In 2000, the FCC imposed an
$8,000 fine on Clear Channel for engaging in payola practices
concerning a Bryan Adams song. 163 Given its past history of
enforcement actions, the FCC seems more concerned about bad
lyrics and indecency complaints on television than payola.
During a recent conference regarding music and payola, FCC
Chairman Adelstein admitted that the FCC did not have the
resources to adequately investigate payola or to examine the
boxes of evidence provided by Mr. Spitzer, at the close of his
investigation, because the FCC was bogged down with
addressing indecency complaints related to radio and television
programming.' 64 In March 2007, for the first time in four years,
all five FCC commissioners appeared before the House
Commerce Committee and were sharply criticized for "failing on65
a number of issues including incomplete investigations."'
161
162

Katunich, supra note 2, at 655.
See id. at 651-52 (citing a lack of manpower as one of the reasons the FCC's

enforcement of payola violations has been lax); see also KCRW's Celia Hirshman Criticizes
FCC for Lack of Action on Payola, Hypebot.com, Dec. 2, 2005, http://hypebot.typepad.com
/hypebot/2005l12/kcrwsceliahir.html.
163 See Katunich, supra note 2, at 652 (discussing the payola practices of Clear
Channel, whereby a local Clear Channel radio station frequently played the Adams song
(despite poor listener response elsewhere) in exchange for his performance at a local radio
station benefit concert. After the concert, the station quickly stopped playing the song.);
see also Phillips, supra note 1.
164 See The National Conference for Media Reform, FCC commissioner Adelstein talks
about Payola (Jan. 12, 2007), available at http://fpsrv2.freepress.net/ncmrO7/audioO7/f3payola.mp3 responding to a question by Paul Porter, who asked why New York could do
what the FCC could not [in regards to investigating payola]) [hereinafter Conference
Audio Transcript]; see also Phillips, supra note 1 (stating that "[u]nless you are a flagrant,
notorious violator, no one will take you to task anymore... [it's like no one is paying
attention to the federal laws on the books."); Charles R. Naftalin, Payola and Plugola
Scandals Return to Center Stage, 7 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 3 (2007), available at
http://www.hklaw.com/content/newsletters/telecom/telecomnewsl005.pdf (predicting that
after the FCC deals with a number of indecency complaints, and telecommunication
service issues, they will focus more attention to payola).
165 Dingell Rips Into FCC For Incomplete Investigations, MEDIAWEEK, Mar.19, 2007,
available at http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/current/article-display.jsp?vnucontentid
=1003559558.

PAYOLA

2008]

Democrat appointed Commissioner for the House Commerce
Committee John Dingell, bashed the commission stating, "When
the FCC loses sight of its proper role, consumers suffer, as does
the credibility
of the FCC ... I fear this has too often been the
6
' 16

case."

B. The Anti-Payola Statutes Are Inadequate to Address Today's
PayolaPractices
In addition to the FCC's inability to adequately enforce the
anti-payola laws, the loopholes created by section 317 and 508
have been successfully exploited by record labels and
independent promoters.
Perhaps one of the main issues
concerning payola practices is in the language and enforcement
of the anti-payola statutes. 167 "Payola" is a term of art and until
Congress passes legislation that expands the scope of what
constitutes illegal payola practices, the only punishable practice
is an undisclosed promise or an exchange of consideration for
broadcast time.168 Radio stations and record labels have become
more sophisticated at skirting payola laws, and recognize that
any sort of consideration received that is used indirectly for
airplay, will not violate the payola laws. 6 9 The anti-payola laws
provide for punishment of a record label when the label "aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" the act of payola
or "willfully causes the act to be done by another such as an
independent promoter."'170 Thus, the rules encourage record
166

See id. Dingell stated further, "I wonder whether we need to schedule an oversight

hearing every month in order to keep the business of the Commission on track." In order
for the FCC to adequately address the payola problem in radio, this author proposes that
Congress split the FCC into two divisions; where one handles indecency complaints and
one deals with payola and illegal financing, in order to be a more effective government
agency and take its oversight responsibility seriously. Id.
167 See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2007) (discussing announcement requirements for payment of
broadcasts); see also 47 U.S.C. § 508 (2007) (specifying disclosure requirements of
payments to individuals connected with broadcasts).
168 See Stilwell, supra note 20 at 417; see also 47 U.S.C. § 508 (requiring both the
person providing or promising to provide money, services or other consideration and the
recipient are obligated to make this disclosure so that the station may broadcast the
sponsorship identification announcement required by Section 317 of the Communications
Act).
169 See Stilwell, supra note 20, at 417 ("Since this exchange of consideration is not
disclosed at the time the paid-for airplay is broadcast, such exchanges are indeed payola
but are difficult to prove since payment ... is ostensibly for something other than
airplay"); see also Naftalin, supra note 164 (discussing examples of payola that are
indirect, subtle, and difficult to track).
170 Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 67, at 539 (codified by 18 U.S.C §2 (1982)).

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:1

company executives to hire indie promoters and then turn a blind
eye to all their practices, as long as the label's artist still climb
the charts. 171 The record company could easily circumvent the
knowledge component of the statutes by avoiding inquiries as to
whether the independent promoter used payola to promote the
label's records.172 The statutes enable indies and record label
executives to exploit the system by using loopholes in the
statutory language of section 508 and section 317 of the antipayola laws. If the FCC is unequipped or unwilling to stomp out
payola, by enacting harsher fines or rewriting the current laws,
there may be other alternatives.
C. Viable Alternatives
i. Re-Write the Laws: Examine Senator Feingold's Bill
On November 18, 2005, Senator Russell Feingold introduced
the Radio and Concert Disclosure and Competition Act of 2005.173
The Act proposes a multi-faceted approach to addressing various
forms of payola by: (1) strengthening the FCC's ability to prove
and punish violations; (2) prohibiting indie third-party indirect
payola; and (3) preventing cross-ownership from hindering fair
competition and requiring disclosure of payments by anyone who
may have an interest in "improperly influencing airplay
decisions.,, 17 ' Building on Spitzer's investigations, Senator
Feingold called for a broad interpretation of the FCC's powers
171 See Boehlert, supra note 103 (arguing that labels have found a way to avoid
liability for payola laws by operating through their lawyers and hiring independent
promoters); Eric Boehlert, Payola City, SALON, Jul. 24, 2001, available at
http://archive.salon.com/ent/music/feature/2001/07/24/urbanradio/index.html
(stating
that "the current system is able to flourish partly because the major labels, reluctant to
make waves inside the profitable format, have adopted a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil
mentality, turning a collective blind eye to the corrupt transactions.").
172 See Sidak & Kronemyer, supra note 67, at 539 (describing the working relationship
between record executives and indie promoters, "[w]hen asked how independent
promoters could promise to secure airplay, one record company president responded: 'You
tell me; all I know is how much it costs."'); see also Nobody in ParticularPresents,Inc. v.
Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1060 (D.Colo. 2004) (indicating that
many believe that record labels use the independent record promotion market as away to
avoid liability for payola).
173 See Radio and Concert Disclosure and Competition Act of 2005, S. S 2058, 109th
Cong. (2005)
(Awaiting
committee
assignment);
FreePress,
Bill
Details,
http://www.freepress.net/congress/billinfo.php?id=164
(last updated Nov. 18, 2005)
[hereinafter Bill Details] (summarizing details of bill).
174 See supra note 173.
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under the current anti-payola laws in order to make a "clear
statement that this new payola is illegal as well." 175 Senator
Feingold's legislation would be an important stepping-stone to
enacting strong legislation that would actually address the
current payola practices engaged by record labels, independent
promoters and radio stations.
ii. Bring A RICO Suit
The FCC's consent decree is not sufficient to deterring payola
practices; the fines imposed are not enough and none of the
payola players are being held personally liable. A lawsuit under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO")
Act may be a more suitable alternative for the government or a
private plaintiff to bring. 176 The RICO statute prohibits anyone
who was employed or associated with an enterprise; that engaged
in or affected interstate commerce (such as using mail or wires);
where the individual operated or managed the enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity; and the plaintiff, or
was financially injured in its business
person bringing the suit,
1 77
because of this activity.
A civil or criminal RICO cause of action may be brought under
the Act. Typically a U.S. Attorney under the Department of
Justice will bring a criminal RICO suit, whereas in a civil RICO
suit, a private party, who meets the required aforementioned
elements, is eligible to bring a suit. 178 Furthermore, the penalties
imposed for RICO violations are harsh. If record companies were
convicted under a criminal or civil RICO suit, they would be
charged with treble damages for engaging in payola.
Additionally, since a criminal conviction under RICO
accompanies a significant prison sentence, and therefore, if
convicted under the criminal RICO statute, radio and record
label executives would be held personally liable for their payola
176 Letter from Russell Feingold, U.S. Senator, to Kevin Martin, FCC Chairman (Nov.
1, 2006), available at http://feingold.senate.gov/-feingoldlpayolaltr_110106.pdf.
176 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2007) (setting forth the RICO Act, its penalties, and
procedure); 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (a) (2007) (stating that person in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1961 can be penalized with fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture of proceeds attained
through the racketeering activity (including property, interest, or contractual right in any
enterprise "which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or
participated in the conduct of, in violation of section 1962")).
177 See 18 U.S.C. §1962 (c) (2007).
178 id.
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actions. 179 Suits under the RICO act would be a viable method of
combating payola practices because courts "look more favorably
bribery, kickbacks,
upon RICO claims based upon...
extortion.., and clearly criminal schemes that are advanced by
the use of mails and wires."' 8 0 Many radio station employees,
record label executives, and indie promoters could be convicted
under RICO since payola practices of bribery or indie kickbacks
most commonly take the form of payments sent in UPS packages,
filled with cash, drugs
or other valuable consideration to radio
8
station employees.1 '

A civil cause of action under RICO exists for any individual
who was injured by an entity's criminal actions. 8 2 Many federal

courts have held that a RICO cause of action "will not lie unless
the plaintiff can establish that the subject damages are directly
caused 'by reason of the criminal activities that RICO was
designed to address."'8 3 Therefore, a suitable plaintiff to bring a

civil RICO suit against label executives and radio stations would
have to be someone who was directly affected by payola, such as
179

Under RICO, a person or group who commits any two of 35 crimes within a 10-year

period and has committed those crimes with a similar purpose can charged with
racketeering, and be fined up to $25,000 and/or sentenced to 20 years in prison. See 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2007); see also Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal,
Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 682-83 (1987).
"'oJeffrey E. Grell, RICO Act, available at http://www.ricoact.comlricoact/index.asp
(last visited Aug. 28, 2007) (asserting that a RICO cause of action can be based upon
violations of the criminal mail and wire fraud statutes, which are very broad).
181 In United States v. Elliott, the court held that Congress, under the mail fraud
statute (18 U.S.C. §1341), has the authority to regulate misuse of the mails. 89 F.3d 1360,
1363-65 (8th Cir. 1996); see Jeffrey E. Grell, RICO Act: RICO In a Nutshell,
http://www.ricoact.com/ricoact/nutshell.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). In order for the
federal courts to confer jurisdiction over a RICO case, a "nexus with interstate commerce"
is necessary. Id. Because the U.S. Constitution confers the postal powers upon the federal
government, acts of mail fraud, even intrastate use of the mails, have an inherent nexus
with interstate commerce. Id. Thus, modern payola practices containing "third party"
indie promotion are not immune to a possible RICO violation because many indies still
engage in payola practices that use channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, such as the mail. Id.
182 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c) (2007) ("Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter [18 U.S.C. § 19621 may sue therefore
in any appropriate United States district court .. ");
see also Gilbert v. Prudential-Bache
Sec., 769 F.2d 940, 941-42 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Violations of section 1962 are criminal offenses
and 'any person injured in his business or property be reason of a violation of section 1962'
has a civil [cause of] action .. " (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970))).
183 See RICO In a Nutshell, supra note 181 (explaining 18 U.S.C. § 1962 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c)); see also Summit Props. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 214 F.3d 556, 559 (5th Cir.
2000) ("[The government can punish unsuccessful schemes to defraud because the
underlying [criminal] mail fraud violation does not require reliance, but a civil plaintiff
'faces an additional hurdle' and must show an injury caused 'by reason of the violation."
(citing Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1498, 1498-99 (11th Cir. 1991))).
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a recording artist. The costs of payola, which can be as much as
hundreds of thousands of dollars, are ultimately passed onto the
recording artists, and taken out of whatever the musicians earn
from their recordings. 184 As Don Henley, popular and longtime
recording artist frankly stated, "I know there's payola because I
get billed for it."' 85 However, since the whole radio and recording
industry is firmly entrenched in payola practices, it may be
difficult for a recording artist to bring a civil RICO suit.1 8 6 If an
established recording artist were bring a suit they may be
8 7 A more viable alternative may be
blackballed in the industry."
for an independent artist or a music watchdog organization to
bring the civil suit against record labels and radio corporate
conglomerates.' 8 8 Nonetheless, a RICO cause of action might be
184

See Slichter, supra note 109. Unknown artists "buy into the hype that independent

promotion is the only way to launch a career," and popular, established artists are
essentially required to continue to pay for payola in order to ensure their songs remain on
the radio. Katunich, supra note 2, at 665. As Dirk Lance of the rock band Incubus stated,
"Independent promotion [and payola practices are] money that disappears from a band's
pocket that is charged to the band and no one knows where it goes or what it actually
does." Id. at 664.
1s5 See Media Ownership: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation,108th Cong. 69, Jan. 30, 2003 (testimony of Donald Henley, a prominent
recording artist).
186 See Tanya Anderson, a disabled single mother, brought a civil RICO suit under
Oregon state law against Atlantic Recording Company and the RIAA, after she was
initially sued by Atlantic for an alleged copyright infringement. The claim against Ms.
Anderson is based on an allegation that she or her eight year-old daughter had illegally
downloaded music on her computer in the middle of the night. Ms. Anderson is suing
Atlantic for two counts of racketeering, claiming that Atlantic is engaging in coercive and
deceptive collection methods against her by mistakenly and fraudulently accusing her of
copyright infringement, and then forcing her to pay thousands of dollars in settlements
and penalties. If this suit is successful, it may pave the way for other civil RICO suits by
artists, or other non-insiders of the music industry in an attempt to bring down payola.
For a list of the court documents in this case, see Index of Litigation Documents referred
to in Recording Industry v. The People, available at http://info.riaalawsuits.us
/documents.htm#Atlanticv_Andersen (last accessed Aug. 29, 2007).
187 A problem that may occur in a civil RICO suit is finding a suitable private plaintiff
that would be willing to bring the suit. For the same reason that record labels are afraid
to cross indies, artists or industry insiders do not want to be black listed in the music and
radio industry. As one manager who represents several platinum selling acts stated, "[The
labels] created the fucking problem, now you want us to put a target on our backs?"
Boehlert, supra note 107.
188 In addition to a civil or criminal RICO suits, the author has examined the
possibility of a possible class action suit against the major record labels, or radio corporate
conglomerates like Clear Channel. Although this is beyond the scope of this article, a
potential lawsuit could be brought on behalf of the listening public by a music advocacy
group or perhaps on behalf of the many artists currently affected by payola. A recent
antitrust suit was filed against Clear Channel in response to the corporation's
threatening to withhold radio airplay to those who refused to play at Clear Channel
sponsored concerts for free. See Carlye Adler, Backstage Brawl, Fortune Small Business,
FORTUNE, Mar. 4, 2002 at 170[C]; Katunich, supra note 2, at 667-68. These are mere
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the most intriguing solution to combat payola. The possibility of
facing treble damages and 20 years in federal prison would make
payola-like violations tremendously risky, as opposed to the
sanctions record labels, indies and radio stations currently face.
iii. Follow In Spitzer's Foot Steps
If the FCC and subsequently the Justice Department are
unwilling to fight against payola, then each state attorney
general should look to bringing their own investigations and
lawsuits against the record labels like New York has done. Due
to the resulting ownership consolidation following the passage of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, media conglomerates have
their influence in practically every state. If the FCC is too busy
or ill equipped to handle such an investigation then states should
look to remedy the problem themselves. The ramifications of
Spitzer's investigations have proven to have "reverberated
widely" beyond New York's borders, and it is more than likely
that payola is occurring all over the country outside of New
York.18 9 If state attorney generals were willing to spend the time
necessary to adequately investigate payola practices, unlike the
FCC, it may result in some actual self-governance by record
labels, and quite possibly the downfall of payola.' 90 If each state
levied their own fines against the payola players, the aggregate
effect could prove to be a serious financial deterrent; $12.5
million in fines is not much cause for concern for the giant media
suggestions of possible ways to combat payola and the author believes that, in the future,
other scholars can build upon these alternatives to stamp out payola once and for all.
159 See, e.g., Jeff Leeds, Payola or No, Edge Still To the Big, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 28, 2005,
at E1 ('The program director of WRHT in Greenville, N.C., who was cited by Mr. Spitzer
as having improperly received a $1,365 laptop computer, $912 in airfare and Playstation
2 equipment from a Sony BMG label, was fired at the end of his shift Tuesday, said
Gordon Herzog, chief financial officer for WRHT's parent, Archway Broadcasting.");
Nowlin, supra note 5 (discussing how Sony BMG had given a flat-screen TV to a Clear
Channel program director in San Diego, California).
190 Eliot Spitzer did not employ a magical formula in his investigation. He was
successful in punishing the payola players in New York because he actually spent time
and money investigating the labels. Warner Music Group spokesman Will Tanous stated,
in response to New York's payola investigation, 'We consider this to have been a valuable
process. From our perspective, radio cannot be too [financially]-driven... [t]he music that
people hear on the radio always should represent the highest quality the industry has to
offer." Gormley, supra note 131. The results of Spitzer's investigate indicate that record
labels, if faced with an adequate deterrent, might actually begin to change their payola
ways. Id. For example, Universal Music Group, one of the parties involved in the Spitzer
investigation, agreed to make reforms as a result of the investigation. See Charles H.
Kennedy, United States: Communications Law Bulletin, Jun. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.mondaq.comlarticle.asp?articleid=40522.
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conglomerates like Clear Channel that gross over $7.9 billion,
but multiply that $12.5 million fine by 50
states and those
191
corporate shareholders might start to notice.
CONCLUSION

Payola has been one of the largest tools to keep voices off the
air. Although it has been around since the turn of the century,
"payola is no longer just the little guy getting a few bucks for a
few spins on the radio. 1 92 In light of the FCC's increased
deregulation in the last ten years, the new payola "is corporately
overseen and driven-a multi-million dollar business.' ' 93 Payola
has corrupted music and resulted in airplay of the same
repetitive songs over and over again, not because they are
popular, but because they are backed by the most money. The
recent half-hearted settlement by the FCC has raised awareness
to the evils of payola, yet it has also led many to question
whether the FCC is the proper authority to finally destroy payola
once and for all. Alternative methods such as Congressional reexaimining and modernizing the anti-payola laws, criminal or
civil RICO actions, or individual state investigations similar to
New York's, are likely the best courses of action to eliminating
payola. No matter the method employed to put a permanent end
to payola, what we know for certain is that the payola beast must
be defeated before listeners tune out of radio, forever.

191 See Adler, supra note 188, at 170 (comparing the revenues of Clear Channel and
Nobody in Particular Presents).
192 See Industry Ears Press Release, supra note 10.
193

Id.

